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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN INTER-
NATIONAL PRODUCT INJURY CASES
A. A Narrative: From Quito to Broadway (Or: How to Win Litigation
with Foreign Plaintiffs without Really Litigating)
Only the quaintest of legal doctrines can produce both spectacle and
irony simultaneously. At an otherwise typical hearing in the august court-
room of the Second Circuit in the Cass-Gilbert-designed public space
known as Manhattan's Foley Square Thurgood Marshall Federal Court-
house, sitting among the lawyers in their pinstripes and wingtips were two
barefoot men in palm skirts with blow-dart guns around their necks, and a
third wearing a blue and yellow crown and a necklace made of feathers.
They were Equadorian Natives from a remote region near the Amazon
River, and they had come roughly 3,000 miles to help demonstrate that,
quite simply, they could-without the "undue hardship" from which their
opponents supposedly sought to protect them. Oddly however, the question
as it finally came before the Court--dismissal of their lawsuit based on fo-
rum non conveniens ("FNC")--did not involve difficulties for the native
. Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, John Marshall
Law School (JMLS), Atlanta, Georgia. Thanks are in order to Professor Timothy Terrell of
Emory University School of Law, whose comments on a draft of another article have sub-
stantially inspired and improved the present work, and to Professor Oscar Chase of New
York University Law School, whose comments on the preservation-of-court-access statute
were both insightful and helpful.
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Ecuadorians, who had traveled so far from home. Rather, it centered on the
inconvenience of a multinational corporation ("MNC"), based in New
York, that wanted to litigate-if at all-in Equador. 1  The corporation,
ChevronTexaco, faced a class action lawsuit alleging that its oil-drilling op-
erations polluted the natives' homes. First filed in 1993, the lawsuit had
been dismissed twice by a federal district court. Subsequent to the two pre-
vious dismissals, the case was remanded in the appellate court for several
months solely to determine whether the case should be heard in the United
States or in Equador.
As this case illustrates, despite the unprecedented free flow of goods
and services internationally-well-represented in the simple fact of palm
skirts and pinstripes occupying the same judicial space-the American fed-
eral courts have used a questionable common law procedural rule to erect a
virtually impenetrable barrier for those injured in other countries by prod-
ucts or industrial activities of U.S.-based multinationals. This barrier exists
as the forum non conveniens ("FNC") rule. The rule is all too familiar to
lawyers who represent foreign citizens and foreign businesses who seek jus-
tice from U.S. courts, which are in the best position to hold U.S.-based
multi-national corporations accountable for their injury-causing conduct.
In my recently published work on the jurisprudential side of this prob-
lem,2 I demonstrated the illegitimacy of the FNC doctrine and, using princi-
ples derived in a Dworkinian analysis, I reconceptualized FNC in an
entirely different form: a preservation-of-court-access rule. I expressed
that rule in the form of a proposed model statute. But as Cervantes ob-
1 Robert F. Worth, A Few More Tourists on Broadway, Barefoot and Craving Roast
Monkey, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at BI. This case is Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., discussed
in Section IV, infra. As a student commentator recently observed, the international plain-
tiffs' battle to bring Texaco to court in its own backyard has taken on epic qualities:
In the Aguinda litigation, the plaintiffs have spent seven years fighting the defense of forum non
conveniens. The peculiar nature of environmental claims makes this defense hard to overcome. The
damages alleged in Aguinda took place and continue to harm an area of the world a continent away
from the Second Circuit. The court has shown reservation to adjudicate these claims because of the
inherent difficulties of determining the actual physical damage from the petroleum production.
However, the plaintiffs allege Texaco headquarters spearheaded the policies and procedures leading
to the damages in Ecuador. Texaco's headquarters, along with all pertinent documents, are in New
York. Additionally, if certified as a class, the named members would reasonably be able to travel to
the United States to testify without an undue hardship.
Lisa Lambert, Case Note, At the Crossroads of Environmental and Human Rights Stan-
dards: Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Hold Multinational Cor-
porate Violators of International Laws Accountable in U.S. Courts, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 109, 127 (2000).
2 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin's Principle-Rule
Distinction to Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-Procedure Dissonance Exempli-
fied by Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in International Product-Injury Cases, 87 MARQ.
L. REV. 425 (forthcoming Spring 2004).
Justice Restored
24:53 (2003)
served, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating.",3 Therefore, this article
addresses the practical side of the matter; does the preservation-of-court-
access rule in practice promote the principles from which it is derived by
changing the outcomes in domestic venue challenges asserted against inter-
national plaintiffs? I conclude that it does, and in this article I seek to dem-
onstrate that the preservation-of-court-access statute produces more
appropriate and fairer results through five case studies of recent litigation
that met untimely ends by FNC dismissals.
B. FNC as a Case Study of Instrumentalist Jurisprudence
The five case studies of recent litigation explored in this article are
emblematic of the profound impact that globalization of markets and con-
sumers has had on the kinds of legal claims arising out of product-
producing and product-consuming accidents whose participants-and vic-
tims-are thrown together across national borders by events of trans-border
impact. As innovations such as GATT, GATS, and NAFTA continue to
open national markets to a globalizing economy, products and activities of
corporations headquartered or with significant operations in the United
States ("U.S.-based MNCs") 4 reach and affect innumerable individuals in
other nations.5 For example, globalization has produced a concomitant in-
ternationalization of the scope of product-related injury claims. 6 Yet de-
spite the unprecedented free flow of goods and services internationally, the
American federal courts often use FNC to virtually replace personal or leg-
islative jurisdiction analysis when foreign plaintiffs seek redress from U.S.-
based MNCs for injury inflicted abroad.' By inducing courts to focus on
narrow, instrumentalist concerns of supposed convenience and fear of
docket congestion, FNC leaves international plaintiffs (particularly those
from developing nations) with only nascent court and legal systems that
3 MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIXOTE, Part I, Book IV, Ch. 10.
4 Joshua N. Rose, Forum Non Conveniens and Multinational Corporations: A Govern-
ment Interest Approach, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 699, 700 n.9 (1986).
5 See, e.g., Emma Suarez Pawlicki, Comment, Stangvik v. Shiley and Forum Non Con-
veniens Analysis: Does A Fear of Too Much Justice Really Close California Courtrooms to
Foreign Plaintiffs?, 13 TRANS. LAWYER 175, 176-77 & nn.2-6 (2000) (noting the expectation
that as "increased interaction" across trade areas increases, there will be "a significant in-
crease in litigation involving parties in both sides"); Lambert, supra note 1, at 109; John
Miller, Globalization and Its Metaphors, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 594 (2000).
6 Stuart Dutson, Product Liability and Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort
in England, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 129, 130 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (discussing "the content
of the choice of law rule in tort in England, and ... apply[ing] it to actions brought under
Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK) against foreign manufacturers in order to
determine the territorial scope of the action created by the Act").
7 Paula C. Johnson, Regulation, Remedy, and Exported Tobacco Products: The Need for
a Response from the United States Government, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 52 (1991) (criti-
cizing FNC as "the most significant obstacle faced by foreign plaintiffs because it has be-
come so pervasive in the international products liability landscape").
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have not matured such that only the rudiments of corrective justice can be
expected. 8
Section II briefly reviews the current problems that the FNC rule
causes and explains its origins. In Section III, I describe my doctrinal shift
away from the FNC rule to a preservation-of-court-access statute. I demon-
strate in Section IV, the focus of the article, how applying that statute would
change the outcome of actual product injury cases filed by international
plaintiffs, in which courts have repeatedly misapplied the current FNC rule
to dismiss lawsuits against U.S.-based MNCs in their own backyards.
II. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS CAUSED BY FNC's PROBLEMATIC ORIGIN
Through the FNC rule, U.S. federal courts have used a questionable
common-law procedural rule to erect a virtually impenetrable barrier for
those injured in other countries by products or industrial activities of U.S.-
based MNCs. FNC was at the heart of the courtroom scene with which this
article opened. The quoted news report of the Ecuadorian lawsuits against
ChevronTexaco, complete with a photograph of three of the plaintiffs in na-
tive dress emerging from a subway stop, has become a familiar story. It is
all too familiar to lawyers, clients, courts, and commentators as the federal
courts have energized the FNC rule to virtually replace personal or legisla-
8 See, e.g., Barry Bearak, In India, the Wheels of Justice Hardly Move, N.Y. TIMES, June
1, 2000, at Al (explaining that cases move at glacial pace in India's overburdened courts,
where criminal defendants who cannot afford bail often serve maximum sentences before
cases come to trial and civil suits are often delayed for decades or more); Raymond Bonner,
Bondage's Load: Heavy Bricks and Crushing Debt, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at A4 (de-
scribing an active system of involuntary servitude in which Pakistani adults and children are
enslaved for years of indenture for small debts to industrial concerns, for although Pakistani
law prohibits such bonded labor, "[t]he law has rarely, if ever, been enforced"); Justice on
the Grass, THE ECONOMIST, June 8, 2002, at 43 (noting that Rwandan courts are choked with
"115,000 suspects in jail awaiting trial" while "so many jurists were murdered or fled the
country in 1994" and concluding that "[t]he courts cannot cope ... [a]t the current pace, it
will take over a century to try them all"). The state of civil proceedings in India's court sys-
tem is hardly atypical among developing countries:
In India, some 25 million cases are pending, a breathtaking pileup of the untried accused and unsatis-
fied aggrieved. By one expert's calculation, if no new actions are filed, 324 years would be needed to
clear the dockets. "Barring expedited circumstances, it's unlikely a civil case would come to a deci-
sion in less than 10 years," said A. M. Ahmadi, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and a
man who has written with exasperation about the legal backlog.
Mr. Bearak summarizes some of the causes of a dysfunctional civil legal system in the de-
veloping world:
While [some lawyers] are highly paid and masterful, the vast majority earn about $2,000 to $3,000 a
year. They commonly enter the profession because their test scores are low... We need systemic
change-and more judges. In India, 75 percent of all cases go to trial, but the ratio of judges to the
population is 10 or 12 per million. In the West, it's 50 to 100 per million. And many of our judges
don't have the best of work habits.
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tive jurisdiction analysis when foreign plaintiffs seek redress from U.S.-
based MNCs for injury inflicted abroad.9 These dismissals have torn the
regulatory fabric by which U.S.-based MNCs are held both accountable for
the safety of those to whom their activities pose risk and responsible for the
harms caused by non-reciprocal risks (i.e. risks of great harm posed by
MNCs to persons and property who create little or no risks toward the
MNC). In other words, these dismissals defeat the overarching tort-law
principle of corrective justice.'l Corrective justice is not realized in cases
where courts focus on narrow, instrumentalist concerns of supposed con-
venience and fear of docket congestion, leaving international plaintiffs (par-
ticularly those of developing nations) with only nascent court and legal
systems that have not matured such that only the rudiments of tort-based re-
lief can be expected." MNCs not only manufacture and distribute products
and engage in business activities that injure people from abroad; their lack
of accountability in U.S. courts has emboldened some MNCs to conspire
with repressive foreign governments in suppressing any dissent that may
encumber their mutual objectives. 12
Did the U.S. Supreme Court intend for such injustice to be the result
when it embraced the FNC doctrine? Probably not. FNC's origins ap-
peared benign and pragmatic in the writing of a usually insightful Justice,
9 Johnson, supra note 7, at 51-52 (criticizing FNC as "the most significant obstacle faced
by foreign plaintiffs because it has become so pervasive in the international products liability
landscape").
10 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv.
537, 538 (1972).
11 See, e.g., Bearak, supra note 8, at Al (explaining that "cases move at glacial pace in
India's overburdened courts, where criminal defendants who cannot afford bail often serve
maximum sentences before cases come to trial and civil suits are often delayed for decade or
more"); Bonner, supra note 8, at A4 (describing an active system of involuntary servitude in
which Pakistani adults and children are enslaved for years of indenture for small debts to in-
dustrial concerns, for although Pakistani law prohibits such bonded labor, "[t]he law has
rarely, if ever, been enforced"); Justice on the Grass, supra note 8, at 43 (noting that Rwan-
dan courts are choked with "115,000 suspects in jail awaiting trial" while "so many jurists
were murdered or fled the country in 1994" and concluding that "[t]he courts cannot cope ...
[a]t the current pace, it will take over a century to try them all").
12 See, e.g., Alex Markels, Showdown for a Tool in Rights Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
2003, at Business 11 (discussing efforts of injured Myanmar citizens to sue Unocal under the
Alien Tort Claims Act in California for human rights abuses that their government inflicted
during Unocal's construction of a natural gas pipeline). As Professor William Dodge, inter-
viewed for that article, observed, "[t]he question is, how far can a corporation like Unocal go
in cooperating with such a regime before the company bears some legal responsibility?" Id.
See also Lawsuits Against Firms: The Alien Problem, THE ECONOMIST, June 21, 2003, at 59-
60 (discussing the Unocal case and similar cases pending in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York "against Fujitsu, Unisys, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, IBM, Du-
etsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, ExxonMobil, Ford, and GM"). In complaining of the "devas-
tating" costs to MNCs if such litigation is allowed, the writer for THE ECONOMIST
unwittingly makes the case for why such suits should proceed to realize corrective justice
and enterprise regulation.
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Robert H. Jackson, who authored the 1947 Gilbert opinion that engrafted
the FNC rule into the American legal system. However, the narrowness of
the reasoning masked the potential to create the problems we see today.
Justice Jackson's failure to account for the long-term impact of the FNC
doctrine was evident immediately to Justice Hugo Black. Prescient as he
often was, Justice Black explained the problem with the doctrine of FNC
without varnish in his dissent from the majority opinion in Gilbert:
The broad and indefinite discretion left to federal courts to decide the question
of convenience from the welter of factors which are relevant to such a judg-
ment, will inevitably produce a complex of close and indistinguishable deci-
sions from which accurate prediction of the proper forum will become
difficult, if not impossible. 13
While Justice Black accurately foresaw that unbridled discretion to
oust forum access would cause problems, even his prediction did not en-
compass the full power of the FNC rule to drive international plaintiffs
from American courtrooms. Subsequently, Justice Scalia confirmed Justice
Black's warning about the effects of the FNC doctrine almost half a century
later:
To tell the truth, forum non conveniens cannot really be relied upon in making
decisions about secondary conduct in deciding, for example, where to sue or
where one is subject to being sued. The discretionary nature of the doctrine,
13 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 516 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Justice
Wiley Rutledge joined this dissent. The "welter of factors" to which Justice Black referred
includes the following:
Private Interest Factors: (1) The relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) The availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) The [comparative] cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witnesses; (4) The possibility of viewing the premises; (5) All other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive; (6) Whether any judgment
eventually obtained could be enforced.
Public Interest Factors: (1) Administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) The un-
fairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty; (3) The local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home; (4) The interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action; (5) The avoidance of unnecessary
problems in conflicts of laws or in the application of foreign law; (6) The appropriateness of a trial in
a forum familiar with the law that will govern the case.
See also Lonny S. Hoffman, Forum Non Conveniens-State and Federal Movements,
SG046 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 441, 453-454 (2002). For an informative
summary of case law illustrating the typically conclusory "application" of these factors to
justify a particular result, see GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITI-
GATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 289-92 (2d ed., 1992).
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combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application...
make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible. 14
What both Justices Black and Scalia were driving at is that the FNC
rule is incoherent-it does not produce consistent or defensible outcomes in
a substantial number of cases. Escaping judicial regulation by means of the
FNC rule, the conduct of MNCs distorts the judicial oversight that regulates
the MNCs' imposition of non-reciprocal risks in modem life. Ultimately,
this creates a regulatory lacuna that frustrates the principles underlying the
tort law to which the U.S.-based MNC has otherwise submitted itself. FNC
produces incoherence between two key principles of tort law: corrective
justice and regulation of actors who create non-reciprocal risks, creating
dissonance between substantive and procedural rules.
Nowhere is the incoherence and analytic dissonance more evident than
in those product injury cases that foreign plaintiffs have filed in states
where MNCs have a strong presence, only to see their legitimate choice of
forum ousted by the FNC rule. In cases where foreign plaintiffs seek com-
pensation from U.S.-based MNCs, federal courts have applied the FNC rule
to dismiss lawsuits in which the procedural rules of court access (i.e., per-
sonal jurisdiction, legislative jurisdiction, and subject matter jurisdiction)1 5
point to a strong jurisdictional basis for the forum's courts to decide the
14 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (holding that in The Jones Act
or federal maritime cases filed in state courts, states may apply their own rules as to FNC);
see Marilyn Maxwell Gaffen, Note, Maritime Law-American Dredging Co. v. Miller: The
Supreme Court Leaves the Forum Non Conveniens Debate Unresolved, 19 W. NEW ENGL. L.
REV. 275, 276-77 (1997); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y 1996), rev'd
sub nom. Jota v. Texaco, Inc. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), opinion on remand, Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002);
Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 159 (Conn. 1999), vacated and remanded,
274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc); Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137 (9 th Cir.
2001); Proyectes Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.1 du Pont de Nemours & Co., 896 F.
Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Ison v. E.I. de Pont de Nemours & Co., C.A. Nos. 97C-06-
093-VAP, 97C-06-094-VAB (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 1997), rev'd 729 A.2d 832 (Del.
1999); In re Silicon Gel Breast Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1469 (N.D. Ala.
1995); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd and modified in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
15 Writings of Professor Stein have inspired my own use of the phrase "court access" to
describe these rules. See Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937
(1991); see also Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-
Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781 (1985). Stein focuses principally on personal juris-
diction, subject matter jurisdiction, and venue as court access rules. I discount statutory
venue for purposes of this article, because the "access" with which I am primarily concerned
is access to an entire court-system-the federal court system, and not a specific court within
the system-and statutory venue's effect on a litigant's choice of court system is greatly
minimized by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406. I add legislative jurisdiction because access to a
court system transcends merely location and judicial personnel to encompass the legal cul-
ture and rules of law normally applied in that court system.
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plaintiffs' claim. Dissonance results from the elimination of product injury
lawsuits whose adjudication serves to accomplish the principles upon which
substantive tort law rules are based (i.e., corrective justice and regulation of
MNC activity that produces non-reciprocal risks).
Incoherence and dissonance are hardly surprising given the origins of
the FNC rule. The FNC rule was conceived in an artificial disconnection
from its shared underpinnings with the rules of other court access rules,
such as legislative jurisdiction and the modern, post-Pennoyer theory of
personal jurisdiction (articulated two years earlier than Gilbert in Interna-
tional Shoe v. Washington).'6 This is not surprising in light of the instru-
mentalist circumstances of FNC's entry into American law. The FNC rule
was largely the brainchild of Paxton Blair, a young associate laboring in a
silk-stocking Manhattan law firm. His 1929 law review article (written
long before International Shoe and failing even to recognize that serious is-
sues of legislative or personal jurisdiction were implicated by FNC dismiss-
als) deplored an alleged crisis in docket overcrowding in the Manhattan
federal and state courts of his day and proposed FNC as a panacea. Blair's
article became the principle source on which the Gilbert Court relied eight-
een years later.' 7 Thus, at its very reception into American legal thought,
the FNC rule was disconnected from the court access rules and did not con-
sider the effects of FNC dismissals on realizing substantive legal goals.
The courts and commentators who embraced the FNC rule appeared un-
aware of or unconcerned with the asymmetrical status that the FNC rule
creates, with the high risk of inconsistent and dissonant outcomes created
by treating the FNC rule as guided only by the "exercise of sound discre-
tion."
18
16 Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
17 Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929); see LARRY L. TEPLEY & RALPH U. WHITTEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE
(2d ed. 2000) (noting that Blair's article is "[t]he original American treatment of the doc-
trine"). In his Gilbert dissent, Justice Black made special note of the dubious source relied
upon by the majority. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 517 n.5 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Peter J.
Kalis & Thomas M. Reiter, Forum Non Conveniens: A Case Management Tool for Com-
prehensive Environmental Insurance Coverage Actions?, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 402 n.37
(1990); Stein, supra note 14, at 811. Blair went on in the same year to win a New York
Court of Appeals case for Central Vermont Railway, which challenged whether service on a
railway director resident in New York was sufficient to acquire personal jurisdiction over the
foreign corporation (then in receivership that restrained the directors from interfering with
the receivers) which had a terminal yard, a short length of track, a pier berth, a freight office,
and a ticket agency located in New York. Chief Judge Cardozo answered in the negative,
and the wrongful death action by the estate of a deceased employee was dismissed. Gaboury
v. Cent.Vt. Ry. Co., 165 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1929).
18 See, e.g., Anne McGinness Kearse, Forfeiting the Home-Court Advantage: The Fed-
eral Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1303 (1998); Henry J. Friendly,
Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L. J. 747 (1982).
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Judicial discretion pushed the FNC rule to logical absurdity in Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, the paradigm case targeting international product in-
jury cases. 19 Reyno represented a misguided effort to protect MNCs from
"forum shopping" by plaintiffs-primarily plaintiffs who happen to be citi-
zens of foreign countries. 20 Each of the court access rules was easily satis-
fied by the Scottish plaintiffs-in-interest in Reyno. Their citizenship was
diverse from that of the U.S.-based corporate defendants, thus satisfying
subject matter jurisdiction requirements. Personal jurisdiction was evident
from the suits having been filed in defendants' backyard. Legislative juris-
diction was also apparent; the home states of the defendants obviously had
an interest in regulating the design and manufacture standards of two U.S.-
based aeronautics producers whose products were distributed globally.2'
Although the rules of court access were fully satisfied, the FNC rule was
invoked and allowed to negate the court access rules in those cases where
the foreign plaintiffs had come to the bailiwick of defendant's operations to
see them. To render an FNC dismissal under these circumstances exposes a
stark analytic dissonance between the court access rules and the FNC rule.
The dissonance is not merely evidenced by differing outcomes; it is also
evidenced at deeper levels. Not only do both sets of rules operate essen-
tially on the same set of jurisdictional facts, those facts that present a strong
case under court access rules are smothered in the unprincipled discretion
afforded by the FNC rule to ignore them (particularly since the defendants
are being sued at home).
Reyno's freewheeling approach to denying federal court access to in-
ternational plaintiffs has become the norm, as the five cases analyzed in
Section IV exemplify. Surprisingly, as noted above, legal scholars have
made little of the analytic dissonance and, in large part, seem to accept it.
Some commentators have partially noted this dissonance, while others have
attempted to discount it as reflection of flaws in court access rules.22 But
whether one favors legislative jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or FNC as
the dominant analysis of whether a case will proceed in the plaintiffs cho-
sen forum, it is indisputable that the three rule sets are integrally related be-
19 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). Among the many discussions of
Reyno, Judge Friendly's discussion was one of the more thought-provoking. See Henry J.
Friendly, supra note 18, at 748.
20 Daniel J. Dorward, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection
of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
141, 159-65 (1998).
21 Reyno, 454 U.S. at 235.
22 Compare, e.g., Dorward, supra note 20, at 167-68 (noting that FNC as practiced by the
federal courts after Reyno differs markedly from the outcomes expected under personal ju-
risdiction analysis and that harmonizing the two doctrines while preserving Reyno would
"require[e] a substantial revision of the due process analysis and the rejection of years of
precedent") and Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a
Role, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1259 (1986), with Alex W. Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A
Confused and Inappropriate Substitute for Forum Non Conveniens, 71 TEX. L. J. 351 (1992).
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cause they all operate on the same set of "jurisdictional" facts defined by
the parties' residence, the parties' activities, and the relationship of the par-
ties' residence and activities to the forum.
23
Likewise, before Reyno, few would have suggested that FNC would
apply in cases where the requirements of all three court access rules were
satisfied. The pre-Reyno prevailing assumption was articulated in 1970 by
Professors Ryan and Berger who observed that "[i]f there is any relevant
connection between the litigation and the forum chosen, the doctrine should
not be applied., 24  Reyno ignored this basic idea, and thereby created an
FNC rule that allows dismissals of suits brought against MNCs in their
home fora.
23 Patrick A. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 19, 100 (1990) ("Be-
yond the extremely limited constitutional doctrine of forum non conveniens, however, the
Constitution has no other general role in regulating state court assertions of personal jurisdic-
tion ..... Absent [a "showing of a practical inability to defend in the forum and the avail-
ability of a realistic alternative forum for the plaintiff"], the Constitution requires deference
to the state's decision to assert jurisdiction."). Although FNC is usually discussed as a
"venue" doctrine, that is a misplaced and analytically-deceptive categorization. See Stein,
supra note 15, at 781; Hoffman, supra note 13, at 441:
Because the private and public interest factors, taken together, overlap to a large degree with the rea-
sonableness factors from the personal jurisdiction test, as articulated by the Court in Asahi Metal In-
dustry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), it would appear that the court is required in
nearly all cases to apply the same factors twice; once as part of the personal jurisdiction inquiry, and
again as part of the forum non conveniens balancing test. Based on these overlapping rules, it is rea-
sonable to expect that if jurisdiction is found to be reasonable, it is unlikely that the court could find
the balance of convenience factors to cut in favor of dismissal.
24 John E. Ryan & Don Berger, Forum Non Conveniens, 1 PAC. L.J. 532, 540 (1970)
(emphasis added). The "relevant connections" to which Professors Ryan and Berger refer
are what are often called minimum contacts with the forum when discussed in analyses of
legislative or personal jurisdiction. In Justice Jackson's defense, he, too, apparently never
dreamed that FNC would become a doctrine of unrestrained discretion. As Judge Friendly
pointed out shortly after Reyno was decided, the Supreme Court had come to neglect a rule
of law that Justice Jackson had articulated to confine the opportunity for the exercise of FNC
discretion:
We hold only that a district court... may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when a defendant shows
much harassment and plaintiffs response only discloses so little countervailing benefit to himself in
the choice of forum as it does here, but indicates such disadvantage as to support the inference that
the forum he chose would not ordinarily be thought a suitable one to decide the controversy.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 531-32.
Judge Friendly observed of this passage that "[t]his sounds like the statement of a rule of
law." Friendly, supra note 18, at 750-751. As a corollary of the "any relevant connection"
observation, Ryan and Berger observed that "[r]esidence by either party in the forum state
will usually preclude the application of' FNC. Ryan & Berger, at 545. This observation, too,
appears to have been ignored when MNCs have persuaded courts to grant FNC dismissals in




Cases like Reyno, are unfortunately, all too familiar in the federal
courts.25 Yet no commentator has identified the heart of the problem and
25 Aguinda, supra note 14, at 534 (FNC dismissal granted against Ecuadorian residents
suing for property damage, personal injury and increased risk of disease caused by negligent
or otherwise improper oil piping and waste disposal practices of a consortium in which the
defendant, a U.S. corporation, held an indirect interest); Satz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. 587 (S.D. Fla. 2001), aff'd, 244 F.3d 1279 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (FNC
dismissal granted against Argentine residents suing, based on diversity in the district court,
for wrongful death of decedents based on product liability for the defective design of the air-
craft involved in an airline crash that occurred in Argentina despite the fact defendant is a
U.S. corporation incorporated in the state of Maryland with its principal place of business in
Washington); Iragorri, supra note 14, at 65 (FNC dismissal granted against Florida domicil-
laries suing for negligence and products liability for the death of decedent caused when he
fell five floors down an open passenger elevator shaft in an apartment building in Columbia,
despite the fact that all of the plaintiffs are U.S. citizens and UTC is an American company
incorporated in the forum); Jota, supra note 14, at 153 (FNC dismissal granted against Ecua-
dorian residents suing for personal injury caused by pollution due to corporation's activities
abroad, despite the fact that the corporation was headquartered in the forum and that the ac-
tivities of the corporation in Ecuador were controlled by the forum corporation); Kilvert v.
Tambrands, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (FNC dismissal granted against U.K.
residents suing for products liability in the deaths of U.K. decedent who died from toxic
shock syndrome, despite the fact that the U.K. manufacturer was a subsidiary of an Ameri-
can corporation, that both companies had some officers and directors in common, that the
decedent used a tampon designed and tested by the defendant in the United States and that
the defendant is a U.S. corporation with its principal place of business in the forum); Or-
chimex, supra note 14, at 1996 (FNC dismissal granted against Costa Rican farmers suing
for personal injury and property damage caused to their crops, lands, and families by pesti-
cide Benlate despite the fact that the forum is the home of DuPont's world-wide headquar-
ters, DuPont is incorporated in the forum, and DuPont's key decisions regarding Benlate as a
product were made in the forum); Silicon, supra note 14, at 1469 (FNC dismissal granted
against plaintiffs suing for personal injury or wrongful death in products liability suit as a
result of breast implants manufactured by the defendants, despite the fact that the actions
against the manufacturers in various United States district courts based on diversity of citi-
zenship were in the forums of the principal places of business of the defendant manufactur-
ers); Ministry of Health, Province of Ontario, Canada v. Shiley Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (FNC dismissal granted against Canadian provinces suing for products liability
for damages which the provinces anticipated incurring in paying medical expenses resulting
from defective valves implanted in patients, despite the fact that the forum is home of
Shiley's world-wide headquarters and Shiley is incorporated in the forum); Dowling v.
Hyland Therapeutics Div., Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(FNC dismissal granted against Irish citizens suing for products liability where the plaintiff,
a hemophiliac, was administered a blood clotting agent prior to an infection he incurred, with
HIV that was contaminated, despite the fact that the defendants, all U.S. corporations, had
subsidiaries in Ireland that marketed and distributed the blood clotting product that was ad-
ministered to the citizen); Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 736 F. Supp. 662 (W.D. Pa.
1990) (FNC dismissal granted against Australian citizen suing for products liability when the
plane he was flying in, manufactured and owned by the defendants, crashed, despite the fact
that the defendants were all based in the U.S. and that one of the defendants, Hanlon & Wil-
son, is headquartered in the forum); Union Carbide, supra note 14, at 842 (FNC dismissal
granted against Indian citizens suing for personal injury in the deaths and injuries of thou-
sands, caused by the leaking of a highly toxic gas in a pesticide manufactured by the defen-
dants, despite the fact that the defendants, who owned the majority of the stock of the
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gone to it. To the contrary, the scholarship divides roughly into three posi-
tions: one, scholars who argue that "properly conducted personal jurisdic-
tion and choice-of-law inquiries eliminate the need for [the] forum non
conveniens doctrine"; 26 two, scholars who contend that the currently-
constituted FNC "doctrine... provides a mechanism for courts to reach de-
sirable forum selection results without distorting the doctrine of personal ju-
risdiction"; 27 and three, scholars who would have FNC swallow personal
jurisdiction doctrine altogether.28
Contrary to the positions espoused by these three camps, the principal
problem of the FNC rule is its lack of principle. Put less aphoristically, the
FNC rule has been devised and applied without reference to the other pro-
corporation, included a company incorporated in the forum, and its headquarters were in the
forum); Frazier v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1129 (D. Minn. 1985) (FNC dismissal
granted against Danish citizens suing for product liability/personal injury due to the use of a
mitral valve prosthesis surgically implanted in the plaintiff, that was manufactured and dis-
tributed in Denmark by the defendant's representatives, despite the fact that that the forum is
the home of St. Jude Medical's world-wide headquarters and St. Jude is incorporated in the
forum); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Ohio 1982), aff'd 865 F.2d
103 (6th. Cir. 1989) (FNC dismissal granted against United Kingdom residents suing for
product liability and injuries received as a result of their mothers' ingestion of the drug De-
bendox during pregnancy, despite the fact that Richardson-Merrell is a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary owned by the U.S. company incorporated in the forum and the defendant's records
and files are located in the forum); Stewart v. Dow Chemical Co., 865 F.2d 103 (6th Cir.
1989) (affirming FNC dismissal granted against Canadian residents suing for product liabil-
ity for injuries caused to them or family members from exposure to toxic herbicides manu-
factured by Dow Chemical despite the fact hat the forum is the home of Dow's world-wide
headquarters, Dow is incorporated in the forum, and the toxic herbicides were manufactured
in the forum); In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, 540 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1982) (FNC dis-
missal granted against American and foreign plaintiffs suing, airlines, company and manu-
facturer for products liability arising from the death of all passengers, who were relatives of
the plaintiffs, aboard a plane that caught fire in flight from Riyadh to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,
despite the fact that the manufacturer of the plane was an American corporation); Nai-Chao
v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406
(9th Cir. 1983) (FNC dismissal granted against Japanese and Chinese residents suing for
wrongful death claims citing negligence and strict liability against a manufacturer arising
from an airplane crash in Taiwan, despite the fact that Boeing was a U.S. corporation);
Abiaad v. General Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'dsub nom. Abiaad v.
C.T. Corp. Systems, General Motors Corp., 696 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1984) (FNC dismissal
granted against plaintiffs, citizens of Lebanon and Brazil residing in Pennsylvania, suing for
personal injuries brought under a products liability theory when the plaintiff was injured
while working on a car manufactured by defendant, when the car's engine burst into flames,
despite the fact that the plaintiffs were residents of the forum and co-defendant General Mo-
tors Corp. was a U.S. based corporation with its headquarters located in the United States).
26 Tepley & Whitten, supra note 17, at 354 n.193 (citing Margaret G. Stewart, supra note
22).27 Id. (citing Alex W. Albright, supra note 22).
28 Borchers, supra note 23. It is interesting that Dean Borchers analogizes personal juris-
diction decisions to the crazy-quilt pattern of the disassembled pieces of a children's jigsaw
puzzle while implying that FNC doctrine is somehow more consistent or coherent. In fact,
as the cases discussed in Section IV, infra demonstrate, the best thing that can be said of the
FNC doctrine is that it has produced a legacy of unprincipled judicial decisions.
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cedural and substantive rules relevant to a litigation case,2 9 and without re-
gard for the principles upon which (in a Dworkinian conception of law at
least) those rules are grounded and which the rules merely exemplify-the
corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles.3 °
Thus, FNC creates a fundamental irony, one that arises between the
rules affording substantive rights and the rules governing the judicial de-
termination process itself Too often, the rules of judicial determination
have arisen from hasty instrumentalism, designed by courts with their own
convenience more in mind than promotion of fundamental principles that
form the foundation of law. Instrumentalism has been criticized when it af-
fects the rules creating legal rights; but it has almost been taken for granted
in rules that define the process for adjudicating those rights. Yet, in the
rules for adjudicating rights, instrumentalism has even more serious conse-
quences. Instrumentalism short-circuits vindication of the same kinds of
(Dworkian) principles/values that underlie the substantive rights. It does so
in a more indirect, covert way that politicizes the judicial process by favor-
ing certain kinds of litigants over others, despite both groups having equal
claims to justice. The rules that apply to the decisionmaker, such as forum
non conveniens, should not be different in the quality and grounding in
principle from those substantive rules (e.g., tort law) that provide the law of
decision. Thus, it is a bitter irony to plaintiffs to find that the promise of
fairness and justice underlying the rules of negligence, strict liability, and
similar causes of action does not always underlie the procedural rules that
determine whether their claims are even heard, such as forum non conven-
iens. Hence, plaintiffs with potentially meritorious claims are deprived of
even the opportunity to present those claims.
Court-process rules that have been hastily crafted for instrumentalist
ends (e.g., perceived judicial convenience) have thwarted the realization of
far more important, systemic Dworkinian principles that are expressed
29 Arguing that substantive and procedural rules are linked in a continuum might seem
surprising at first, but it is the very absence of this link in the scholarship and reported opin-
ions that has prevented a meaningful examination of the problem caused by FNC when rou-
tinely applied to deny an American forum to the international plaintiff. Procedure is simply
the handmaiden (to use a dated but vivid phrase) to substantive law. Thus, procedure is not
an objective in itself, but rather a means of accomplishing the objectives of the substantive
law.30 See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967); Rose,
supra note 4, at 708. The ultimate purpose of all of procedural rules is to effect the goals of
the substantive law derived from common principles. See Van Detta, supra note 2. Forum
non conveniens has torn the fabric of this continuum because the Supreme Court has allowed
it to be treated sui generis without considering its relationship to the other procedural doc-
trines and to the goals of substantive law. Instead, it has been allowed to act as a kind of
analytic shortcut, in which supposedly-overburdened federal judges can, in effect, "pull the
plug" on a case regardless of whether the defendant is a U.S.-based MNC whose conduct is
most appropriately regulated and judged by the courts in a U.S. forum. Thus, FNC doctrine
is producing results that strike the objective viewer as unfair.
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through substantive rules of law. In this manner, instrumentalism underly-
ing forum non conveniens has thwarted the realization of two vitally impor-
tant Dworkinian principles, the corrective justice principle and the
enterprise regulation principle, by allowing courts to excuse major business
enterprises from accountability for their torts in the courts of their home
states through FNC dismissals.
My recognition of the symmetry that ought to exist between the sub-
stantive and procedural rules that apply in a given "litigation event" (my
term for the set of "substantively" and "procedurally" relevant facts in a
given case) provided the basis for constructing a new rule-a "preservation
of court access" rule-that is consonant with legal principle, substantive
tort rules, and court access rules. Applying the preservation-of-court-access
rule in representative case studies demonstrates how a rule focused on pres-
ervation rather than denial of access produces results that are coherent and
consonant with the principles and their rule-articulated progeny. In Section
III, I provide the particulars of that rule, to permit us to examine in Section
IV specific contrasts in outcome-and justifiability of outcome-in five in-
ternational product injury cases depending on whether the FNC rule applies
(as it was resulting in the dismissal of each case) or the preservation-of-
court-access rule is applied (in which event, each of the cases would remain
in the forum chosen by the international plaintiffs).
III. THE PRESERVATION-OF-COURT-ACCESS STATUTE
A. The Methodology Behind the Preservation-of-Court-Access Statute
In my jurisprudential examination of the instrumentalist approach to
rule-making that leads to serious analytical dissonance across the gray bor-
der of substantive rules and procedural rules, I suggested that the entire sub-
stantive-procedural relationship be reconceptualized by returning to the
principles in which rules must be justified in our legal system. Following
the approaches of Ronald Dworkin and George Fletcher, I posited that the
relevant principles are the corrective justice and enterprise regulation prin-
ciples. I have argued that those principles require rules of substance and
procedure to operate in harmony to provide litigation outcomes that pro-
mote both principles. First, outcomes should promote corrective justice by
providing compensation to those on whom an MNC's activities impose
non-reciprocal risks. Second, the state's obligation to regulate the MNCs to
which the state provides aid and comfort through either incorporation or
hosting requires a presumption of court access in the MNC's home state so
that the courts may discharge their regulatory functions. I demonstrated
that the FNC rule, as currently conceptualized, defeats both principles by
allowing home-state courts to dismiss cases brought by foreign plaintiffs in
the bailiwick of an MNC, resulting in an abdication of the regulatory func-
tion and, often, in the inability of those plaintiffs to realize a meaningful
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opportunity to obtain compensation for injury due to the MNC's activities
that imposed on them a non-reciprocal risk.
After surmounting this summit of theory, I began the journey back to
practical application of the theory's teachings by extrapolating a rule from
the relevant principles, a process I have demonstrated in other of my writ-
ings on a variety of subjects.31 My objective was to apply the lessons from
reconceptualizing FNC to deriving a rule that both serves the principles of
corrective justice and enterprise regulation, as well as integrates with the
existing court-access rules. I endeavored to express that rule in the form of
a model statute. The model statute is a vehicle to allow Congress to over-
rule Gilbert, Reyno, and their progeny, and to replace them with positive
law that vindicates, rather than vitiates, the principles upon which the court
access rules are founded.32 The model statute is set out below, followed by
a commentary section that should be enacted with the statute to ensure that
the courts do not misperceive the scope and rationale of the changes that the
statute effects. Following the statute and commentary, subsection IV dis-
cusses how the statute advances the principles of corrective justice and en-
31 See Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Constitutionalizing Roe, Casey, and Carhart: a Due-Process
Anti-Discrimination Principle to Give Constitutional Content to the "Undue Burden" Stan-
dard of Review Applied to Abortion Control Legislation, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 211 (2001); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le roi est mort; Vive le roi!t": An Essay on the
Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglass and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After
Desert Hotels v. Costa Into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. _ (forthcoming
Fall 2003); see also Jeffery A. Van Detta, Compelling Governmental Interest Jurisprudence
of the Burger Court: A New Perspective on Roe v. Wade, 50 ALB. L. REV. 675 (1986); Jef-
frey A. Van Detta, "An Enemy of the People": Applying Fletcher's Nonreciprocal Risk
Theory of Corrective Justice to Construct a Model for Victims of the New Smallpox Vaccine
Battle in the "War on Terrorism" (in progress); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Should Technical Er-
rors in Complex Neurosurgery Violate the Tort Standard of Care? A Corrective Justice Ap-
proach Based on a Case Study of the Anterior Cervical Discectomy Procedure (in progress).
32 Some commentators have prepared model statutes as vehicles for reform other federal
court procedures. See, e.g., Thomas J. Rowe, Jr., Jurisdictional and Transfer Proposals for
Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 325 (1991). Others have proposed a legislative solution
to the problems caused by forum non conveniens in more instrumentalist vein and without
making a detailed statutory proposal. See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Juris-
diction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a
Proposal for a Uniform Standards, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 501, 503 (1993) (proposing "federal
legislation establishing standards for jurisdiction over alien defendants and clearer rules for
access to United States courts by foreign plaintiffs injured abroad."). Others have made a
detailed statutory proposal that "simply refines and codifies existing common law" and ex-
pressly eschews any effort whatsoever of "eliminating judicial discretion." Peter J. Carney,
Comment, International Forum Non Conveniens: "Section 1404.5 "-A Proposal In The In-
terest Of Sovereignty, Comity, and Individual Justice, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 415, 461-64 (1995).
Still others have noted that states have proposed or adopted forum non conveniens statutes
that, unfortunately, do little more than purport to codify Gilbert and Reyno for a state-court
system. See, e.g., Michael J. Jenkins, Note, Georgia on the Nonresident Plaintiffs Mind:
Why the General Assembly Should Enact Statutory Forum Non Conveniens, 36 GA. L. REV.
1109, 1130-33, 1144-47 (2002).
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terprise regulation when applied to case studies of actual litigation events in
which the old FNC rule played a preeminent role.
The model statute would fit best among the traditional transfer statutes
in the U.S. Judicial Code, Title 28 of the United States Code. First, the text
of the proposed statute is set out within the context of a proposed bill to en-
act it. The explanatory comments should appear in the United States Code
following the statute. Although such a practice is unusual for the Code, it is
typical of Federal Rules compilations in the form of Advisory Committee
Notes and typical of Uniform Acts, such as the Uniform Commercial
Code's "Official Comments" following each section.33 Given the magni-
tude of the change this provision would bring, it is submitted that more de-
tailed and directive commentary may be necessary, and therefore should be
readily accessible to guide the courts who must use it.
Second, the bill to enact the statute posits a fairly precise and congenial
home within the U.S. Code. The proposed model statute will fit best within
the "1400s" Section of Title 28, which deal with transfer of venue, and par-
ticularly as a companion to Section 1404, which deals with transfer of
venue for the convenience of parties and witnesses. Unlike Section 1404,
the proposed statute-"Section 1404. 1"-focuses on preserving plaintiff s
chosen forum, rather than ousting it. The text of a proposed bill and com-
ments for codification of Section 1404.1 appear below:
THE MODEL PRESERVATION-OF-COURT-ACCESS LEGISLATION
A Bill to Preserve Court Access for Injured Persons Seeking justice in the
Courts of the United States
Section 1: Overruling of Prior Cases
The rule of forum non conveniens announced in GulfOil v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947), Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 255 (1981), and ap-
plied in all other federal court decisions relying upon those cases, is overruled
as of the effective date of this section.
33 See, e.g., Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 597, 604 n.19 (1966):
Although the Comments appended to each section of the Code are unusually elaborate, the use of
this technique is not entirely novel. In fact, for more than half a century, it has been the custom of
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to append to most of the sections of the uniform laws a
note explaining briefly the purpose of the section and the prior case law which the section was in-
tended to codify or to change; sometimes these notes contain references to leading treatises or other
literature.
Id. at 607. In particular, a "comment may be primarily concerned with explaining and de-
fending the way in which the Code section differs from its predecessor." Id.
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Section 2: Codification of Court access Statute
Title 28 of the United States Judicial Code shall be amended to add a new
section to be numbered "1404.1 ." The text of Section 1404.1 follows:
1404.1[]]: Policy
It shall be the policy of the courts of the United States to preserve a plain-
tiffs access to the federal courts when that plaintiff commences litigation that
satisfies the requirements for jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction of
the subject matter.
1404.1[2]: Definitions:
Prejudice shall mean that the defendant cannot enjoy the opportunity to
present a defense that satisfies the minimum standards of due process of law in
the U.S. Constitution. To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence establish that it would be a manifest miscarriage of
justice for trial to be held in the plaintiffs chose forum. In order to establish
such a manifest miscarriage, defendant must show that:
It would be deprived of access to evidence necessary to preserve a sub-
stantial right; or
The cost of the litigation in the forum is so disproportionate to the defen-
dant's financial and physical resources that defendant would be deprived of the
opportunity to be heard; or
The forum state has no legitimate, regulatory interest in the defendant's
conduct that might be advanced by adjudication in the forum; or
It would violate the defendant's rights under an international treaty rati-
fied by the United States or to which the United States is a signatory.
In determining prejudice to the defendant of a trial in the forum, the fact
there may be other fora in which the action may be filed shall be accorded no
consideration.
Minimum contacts shall mean the operative facts that describe a relation-
ship between the defendant and the forum.
Every use of the masculine pronoun shall include the feminine pronoun.
1404.1[3]: Preservation of Court Access
A. General Rule of Court Access
(1) In all civil cases in which a court of the United States -
may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant consistent with the
requirements of the U.S. Constitution; and
(2) is possessed of jurisdiction of the subject matter under applicable stat-
ute(s) of this title
- access to such court shall be preserved to the plaintiffs in such cases,
without regard to nationality, citizenship, or residence; and such court cannot
dismiss a case under this section unless the defendant makes one of the show-
ings specified in Section 3.B, infra.
B. Grounds for Dismissal upon Defendant's Showing of Prejudice
In all cases in which a defendant has systematic and continuous minimum
contacts with the forum and the plaintiff is suing on one or more causes of ac-
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tion arising out of those contacts, it is conclusively presumed that defendant
cannot establish prejudice and that plaintiff's court access shall be preserved.
In all cases in which a defendant has only single or occasional minimum
contacts with the forum and the plaintiff is suing on one or more causes of ac-
tion arising out of those contacts, a presumption arises that defendant is not
prejudiced by the maintenance of action in the forum. The defendant may re-
but that presumption with admissible evidence that clearly and convincingly
establishes prejudice.
In all cases in which a defendant has continuous and systematic minimum
contacts with the forum and plaintiffs cause of action does not arise out of
those contacts, a presumption arises that defendant is prejudiced by mainte-
nance of the action in the forum. The plaintiff may rebut that presumption
through admissible evidence that:
(1) establishes that defendant is either incorporated in the forum or main-
tains a principal residence, a functional headquarters, or a branch office in the
forum; or
(2) establishes that the defendant's contacts with the forum demonstrate
that defendant has engaged in such a continuous and systematic course of "do-
ing business" in the forum as to support the conclusion that it is present in the
forum; or
(3) establishes that one of his causes of action are related to the defen-
dant's forum contacts and defendant would not be prejudiced by maintenance
of the suit within the forum.
The showings described in this section shall be made by a preponderance
of admissible evidence.
In all cases in which a defendant has only single or occasional minimum
contacts with the forum and the plaintiffs cause of action do not arise out of
those facts, prejudice to defendant requiring dismissal of the case shall be con-
clusively presumed.
COMMENTS TO SECTION 1404.1
Comment to Section 1404.1[2][A]: This section is intended to overrule
the use of the amorphous public and private interest factors first stated in Gil-
bert. Many of these factors proved not to relate to the core issue of prejudice
to a defendant. Prejudice as defined herein is the only acceptable basis for
dismissing an action that otherwise satisfies court access rules. The eliminated
factors reflected inappropriate paternalistic concerns about the burden on the
plaintiff of his own chosen forum, or burdens on the forum that should be
naturally attendant upon satisfaction of the standard court access rules. The
eliminated factors have been replaced with factors that, if proven by defendant,
establish the degree of prejudice upon which dismissal of an action may be
based within the intent of this section. In addition, the factor of other available
for a under the previous forum non conveniens rule could be misapplied by the
courts. Some courts tended to dismiss any time that a non-forum plaintiff
might arguably have had the choice to sue in the place of his residence or
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domicile. However, dismissals under this Section do not permit such highly
speculative or subjective considerations to come into play. Experience under
the prior rule established that many dismissals were based on too little accurate
information about prejudice to the international plaintiff in the alternative for-
eign forum. This section recognizes the tremendous difficulty that a court in
the United States will often have in trying to understand the practicalities and
realities of litigation in the court systems of another country with which
American lawyers are not intimately familiar. Corroborative of that fact is that
most lawsuits dismissed on the assumption that an alternative foreign forum
was "available" were not refiled in the alternative foreign forum.
Comment to Section 1404.1 [3]: This provision overrules the statement in
Reyno that there should be any differentiation in the relative "right" to court
access in the courts of the United States depending upon whether the plaintiff
is a citizen, subject, or resident of a foreign state. Such distinctions are illogi-
cal in cases in which the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum and
have no relevance to the underlying court access rules. In suing the same de-
fendant with the same minimum contacts to the forum, the plaintiff's citizen-
ship, nationality, or residence should not lessen the forum's interest in the
matter. Thus, the former forum non conveniens rule produced inconsistent and
discriminatory results between plaintiffs who were similarly situated but for
those irrelevant factors. Under this section, all plaintiffs stand equally before
the law.
Comment to Section 1401.1 [3][B][3][ii]: Before the advent of the mini-
mum contacts test in International Shoe, the federal courts had recognized that
a non-resident can engage in such a pervasive course of conduct within the fo-
rum that it was reasonable to conclude that the non-resident was a functional
resident and thus generally amenable to the court's jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 267, 268-69 (1917), where
Judge Cardozo observed of the foreign corporation:
If in fact it is here, if it is here, not occasionally or casually, but with
a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then, whether its busi-
ness is interstate or local, it is within the jurisdiction of our courts...
The essential thing is that the corporation shall have come into the
state. When once it is here, it may be served; and the validity of the
service is independent of the origin of the cause of action.
Id.; see also Philadelphia & Rdg. Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); De-
luxe Ice Cream Co. v. R.C.H. Tool Corp., 726 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1984);
Broadcasting Rights Int'l Corp. v. Societe du Tour de France, SARL, 675 F.
Supp. 1439 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Lea Brilmayer, et al., A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REv. 721 (1988).
Comment to Section 1401.1[3][B][3][iii]: This provision guarantees
court access in those for which can properly be considered a defendant's
"home." The special provision for rebutting the anti-access presumption for
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cases in which a defendant's activities make it present within the forum but do
not rise to the level of making the forum a "home" recognizes, as Justice
Brennan did in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
425-26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting), that contacts might still be jurisdic-
tionally relevant even if, in a causal sense, the action cannot not be said to
arise out of the contacts. In those cases, the relationship of the contacts to the
action coupled with a lack of prejudice to defendant should preclude dismissal.
Reliance on "related contacts" in that scenario is appropriate because the Su-
preme Court majority in Helicopteros specifically declined to decide whether
the broader set of "related" contact would be constitutionally sufficient for the
exercise of forum sovereignty. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.10.
IV. FIVE CASE STUDIES COMPARING THE EFFECT OF THE "OLD" FNC
RULE TO THE MODEL "PRESERVATION-OF-COURT-ACCESS" STATUTE
The benefits of recognizing the principle-rule distinction combined
with viewing substance and procedure along the continuum of the litigation
event, rather than categorically, has allowed to us to propose a codification
of FNC as a "preservation of court access" rule. The question remains,
however: Is this intellectual effort in reconceptualizing not only FNC, but
also the general legal context in which FNC operates along with a host of
other rules, worth it? The best way to answer this question is to review a
representative sample of recent FNC cases involving international plaintiffs.
In the subsections below, we examine five cases in which FNC dismissals
were granted by the trial court: Lueck v. Sundstrand; Iragorri v. United
Technologies; Proyectos Orchime de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co.; Ison v. E.1. duPont DeNemours & Co.; and Aguinda v.
Texaco. For each of these cases, we will demonstrate how the application
of the FNC doctrine produced results squarely at odds with both the correc-
tive justice and enterprise regulation principles. Then each case is re-
evaluated under the reconceptualized FNC rule embodied in the model
"Preservation-of-Court-Access Rule"; the reconceptualized FNC rule in
each case would change the outcome of the FNC issue and produce results
that accord both with the principles as well as with the court access rules.
A. Ignoring the Continuum of the Litigation Event: Permitting Honeywell
to Escape a Domestic Forum Where New Zealand Plaintiffs Sought Judicial
Regulation of Honeywell's Defective Ground Proximity Warning System
(GPWS) in Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp.
1. The MNC Defendant's FNC Strategy
Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp.34 is a typical example of how the use of
FNC can defeat the goals of tort law expressed through the corrective jus-
34 Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001).
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tice and enterprise regulation principles, as well as produce an outcome in-
consistent with the analysis of the same facts under court access rules.
Here, New Zealand citizens and their relatives came to the U.S. District
Court in Arizona to bring a products liability lawsuit against a Canadian
aircraft manufacturer and the American manufacturers of the aircraft's
Ground Proximity Warning System ("GPWS"). The commercial airline
crash that injured or killed the plaintiffs' relatives was allegedly caused, in
part, by a malfunction of the GPWS's radio altimeter. Defendant Honey-
well manufactured the radio altimeter in Arizona, the plaintiffs' chosen fo-
rum. Defendant de Havilland, the aircraft's manufacturer, although a
Canadian operation, is a subsidiary of Boeing Company, then based in
Washington. Defendant Sundstrand, also of Washington State, incorpo-
rated the Honeywell radio altimeter into its GPWS. Airline regulators in
New Zealand, Canada, and the United States investigated the GPWS fail-
ure. Indeed, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") conducted on-
site investigations at the facilities of the Washington and Arizona defen-
dants.35
Despite the clear domestic connections, the corporate defendants filed
an FNC motion when relatives of the deceased aviators sued the corporate
defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The Dis-
trict Court, they urged, should determine that New Zealand was the appro-
priate forum for this litigation. Why? Certainly not because the defendants
had any operations or even a business presence in New Zealand. What did
New Zealand have? The accident equivalent of no-fault automobile insur-
ance or worker's compensation law. Under New Zealand's Accident Com-
pensation Act, personal injury from any accident, no matter how caused, is
treated like a worker's compensation claim, with the award from public
body of a percentage of lost earnings during periods of disability.36 New
Zealand law also permits separate suits for mental distress and punitive
damages. But it is clear that "the amount of compensation payable" under
New Zealand law "may not equal the damages the plaintiffs could recover
in an action" under American law.37 The district court granted defendants'
motion and dismissed on FNC grounds.
In affirming the FNC rule dismissal, the Ninth Circuit gave no consid-
eration to the strength of the factual basis upon which the court access rules
were satisfied. Instead, in examining the Gilbert and Reyno private and
public interest factors, the Ninth Circuit panel made observations that dem-
onstrated just how loosely the Gilbert factors are applied in practice. For
example, the court observed that there was no clear balance in the factors
relating to access to proof:
35 For a more detailed factual background, see id. at 1140-41.
36 Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387-89 & n.1 (David G. Owen rev. ed., 1997).
37 Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1144.
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Plaintiffs and Defendants each find a different forum to be more convenient
because each party focuses on different evidence and witnesses. Plaintiffs fo-
cus on the evidence relating to the testing of the radio altimeter and GPWS,
which occurred in the United States, so they argue Arizona is a more conven-
ient forum. Defendants, on the other hand, focus on the evidence relating to
the crash itself and Plaintiffs' ongoing medical care, so they contend that New
Zealand is a more convenient forum.38
However, after conceding that "[b]oth the United States evidence and
the New Zealand evidence are crucial to this dispute, 39 the court placed its
finger on the New Zealand pan of the scale on the grounds that "the jury
will need to consider the performance of the equipment in relation to the
performance of the flight crew."40 The court's public interest analysis is
even terser, reminiscent of a first-year law student's essay answer:
The citizens of Arizona certainly have an interest in the manufacturing of de-
fective products by corporations located in their forum. However, this interest
is slight compared to the time and resources the district court in Arizona would
expend if it were to retain jurisdiction over this dispute. Furthermore ... [t]he
crash involved a New Zealand airline carrying New Zealand passengers ...




41 Id. at 1147. The panel and the district judge also both asserted that New Zealand law
would govern the suit in Arizona, "law with which it is unfamiliar." Id. at 1148 n.6. This
rationale is not persuasive. New Zealand, of course, is an English-speaking country that
shares the English common-law heritage. There should be no difficulty in interpreting and
applying New Zealand law. More important, however, is the questionable assertion that
New Zealand law should apply to adjudicate the actions or omissions of American corpora-
tions in America. Luther M. MacDougal, The Real Legacy of Babcock v. Jackson: Lex Fori
Instead of Lex Loci Delicti and Now It's Time for a Real Choice-Of-Law Revolution, 56 ALB.
L. REv. 795, 797-98 (1993) (discussing various articulations of lexfori choice-of-law ap-
proaches and their prominence in state court decisions and concluding in examining how
courts are engaging in contemporary choice-of-law decisions that "Courts should apply the
tort rule that best promotes contemporary socioeconomic policies in domestic, transstate, and
transnational cases unless precluded by a constitutional forum state statute."). See Patrick J.
Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357,
370-72 (1992) (tabular data on lexifori outcomes in state court cases); Rose, supra note 4, at
699 (arguing that because "the United States has a compelling governmental interest in com-
pensating victims of extraterritorial toxic torts" for which the activities of U.S.-based MNCs
are responsible, courts should generally "implement the applicable state law rather than the
law of the place of injury"); compare Michael R. Costagliola, Recent Development: Juris-
diction and Conflicts of Law-The Bhopal Litigation, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 637, 644-45
(1985) (noting that under a "governmental interest analysis," states in which an MNC is in-
corporated, has engaged in corporate planning, or has made decisions relating to the design,
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2. Why FNC Is Inappropriate in Lueck: Applying the New Model Statute
Professor Patricia Youngblood developed a pioneering way to organize
the rules of personal jurisdiction into a coherent and more predictable pat-
tern by representing them, metaphorically, in a four-quadrant Cartesian co-
ordinate plane.42 In contrast to the Ninth Circuit's amorphous analysis,
Professor Youngblood's court access metaphor shows that this is the para-
digm case for personal and legislative jurisdiction.4 3 Although we are not
manufacture, or operation of a product or foreign activity "have an interest in holding corpo-
rations to a high standard of care to effect deterrence") with Michael S. Green, Legal Real-
ism, Lexi Fori, and the Choice-of-Law Revolution, 104 YALE L.J. 967 (1995). For views that
argue that the realities of the inadequacies of foreign legal systems should be ignored-
views that do not even appear to be aware of or to consider the imperatives of the enterprise
regulation principle-see, e.g., Mark B. Rockwell, Choice Of Law in International Products
Liability: "Internationalizing" The Choice, 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 69, 91 (1993)
(advocating out of comity concerns a modem lex loci doctrine based on a presumption of
foreign-law competency to deal with a products liability issue).
42 Patricia J. Youngblood, Constitutional Constraints On Choice Of Law: The Nexus Be-
tween Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 50
Alb. L. Rev. 1, 6-10 (1986); see Van Detta, supra note 2.
43 As Professor Youngblood observed, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 325 U.S.
310 (1945), "identified two jurisdictional variables of primary relevance" that function as the
basis for the minimum contacts rules: [1] "the quantity and frequency of the defendant's fo-
rum acts" which "distinguishes continuous and systematic forum contacts from single or oc-
casional forum contacts"; and [2] "the relationship these acts bear to the cause of action upon
which the plaintiff sues." Youngblood, supra note 42, at 5. There are four possible combi-
nations for describing the litigation event using these variables, as Youngblood illustrated
using the graphic metaphor of the Cartesian coordinate plane represented in the diagram be-
low, which illustrates that each of the four quadrants of Youngblood's Cartesian metaphor is
an archetypical litigation event to which one of the four general rules articulated in the Inter-
national Shoe opinion directly corresponds:
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presented with a factual record built for a court access analysis, we have
enough facts to see that this case should never have been dismissed on FNC
grounds. Honeywell was sued in its back yard-where it was doing busi-
ness-and was unquestionably subject to personal jurisdiction in plaintiff's
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tion, and the forum, there can be no stronger ties to a forum than a defen-
dants' seat of its business being located in the forum. As to a defendant
such as Honeywell, there should be a conclusive presumption-
irrebuttable-that there is no FNC issue arising from the relationship of the
parties, the litigation, and the forum. This defendant would be subject to
Sections 3.B and 3.B. 1 of the Model Statute. Under those sections, the Dis-
trict Court had jurisdiction under Section 3.A and under Section 3.B.1,
Honeywell's systematic and continuous contacts create the conclusive pre-
sumption "that [it] cannot establish prejudice and that plaintiffis'] court ac-
cess shall be preserved."
Nor should de Havilland (a/ik/a Boeing) or Sundstrand's effort to ob-
tain an FNC dismissal have succeeded. Their relationship to the Arizona
forum is not much weaker than Honeywell's. Although they are non-
resident defendants, they easily fall within Quadrant I of Professor Young-
blood's court access metaphor. Both de Havilland and Sundstrand must
engage in systematic and continuous contact with their Arizona radio al-
timeter supplier, Honeywell, and the plaintiffs products liability cause of
action is connected to-indeed, "arises out of'-the joint manufacturing ef-
fort the three defendants engage in, starting with the prime component, the
radio altimeter, in Arizona.
In a personal jurisdiction analysis, therefore, the parties' litigation and
forum facts add up to judicial jurisdiction that "'has never been doubted'
when the defendant's forum activities have not only been continuous and




In such a case, there is no principled justification for reaching an FNC con-
clusion completely at odds with court access doctrine. Again, Model Stat-
ute Sections 3.A and 3.B. 1 would control the disposition of de Havilland's
and Sundstrand's FNC strategy. An irrebuttable presumption that FNC was
inapplicable should therefore have controlled the outcome of Lueck.
44 An international convention has been drafted for conflicts in transnational products li-
ability litigation containing four principal parameters for making a choice of law to govern a
product-injury lawsuit; however, it is evident that the convention is too heavily dependent on
a lexi loci rationale, as it typically gives the plaintiff's place of residence decisive weight,
without recognizing the needs of corrective justice served by enterprise regulation of busi-
ness in the defendant's home. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, A Proposed Choice-Of-Law
Standard For International Products Liability Disputes, 16 BROOK. INT'L L.J. 225, 232-33
(1990) (discussing The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability). For
a discussion of various scholars' approaches to the products liability law-choice issue along
with a suggestion that focuses on the sits of product distribution, see P. John Kozyris, Inter-
est Analysis Facing Its Critics-And, Incidentally, What Should Be Done About Choice of
Lawor Products Liability?, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 569 (1985).
4 See, e.g., David Beaty, The Naked Pilot: The Human Factor in Aircraft Accidents, 68-
74, 134, 162-63, 178-81 (1995); Ground Proximity Warning System, at http:/l
www.boeing727.com/ Data/systems/infogpws.html (describing five critical scenarios, or
"modes," in which GPWS triggers) (last visited Dec. 13, 2002); 45 C.F.R. § 135.153 (Fed-
eral Aviation Administration GPWS regulation).
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(a) How Applying the Model Statute in Lueck Recognizes the Intersecting
Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation Principles
The need to effectuate the corrective justice principle in cases such as
this is strong. Airlines, pilots, and the flying public depend entirely upon
aviation manufacturers and the critical navigation components incorporated
into each aircraft to provide for their safety. GPWS evolved from a terrible
legacy of aircraft accidents due to a variable combination of human factors,
environmental factors, and technological limitations.45 To reassure their
constituencies, aviation manufacturers developed and implemented with
their technology partners GPWS. However, the risk created by a poorly-
designed or mis-manufactured GPWS is grossly nonreciprocal to those who
suffer the consequences-catastrophic loss of the lives of passengers and
crew.
Corrective justice is best achieved here through judicial regulation of
the principal players in the country where the tort (in design and/or manu-
facture) likely occurred-here, the United States. Much like the malfunc-
tioning power plant and propeller at the heart of Reyno, the malfunctioning
GPWS is the kind of product produced by the kind of MNC producers-
ultimately, Boeing, with its subsidiary and American vendors Sundstrand
and Honeywell-that is most effectively regulated by the American courts
where three of the four entities involved are headquartered and actively en-
gaging in designing and manufacturing aircraft. Thus, the regulatory inter-
est in the United States is strong, and this case inhabits that core domain
where the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles fully over-
lap.
46
46 See Van Detta, supra note 2, at Diagram 5. For the conveniences of the reader, that
diagram is reproduced on the next page.
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CONCEPTUALIZATION OF LITIGATION EVENTS AS PRINCIPLES MAPPED
TO JURIDICAL JURISDICTION RULES
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Operative facts of litigation events fall with in domain of Corrective Justice Principle, but
outside domain of Enterprise Regulation Principle - Maps to Cartesian (Quadrant IV).
[l Operative facts of litigation events fall within domain of both Corrective Justice and
Enterprise Regulation principles - Maps to Cartesian (Quadrant 1).
- Falls on limb of intersection between domains of Enterprise Regulation and Correctiv
Justice principles - May fall outside Enterprise Regulation Principle Domain depending
on [I ] Quality and/or [2] Quantity of minimum contacts (Quadrants 1I and III).
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B. Elevating the Traditional Procedure/Substance Dichotomy over
principles of Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation: How Otis
Elevator Almost Forced the Widow of a Naturalized U.S. Citizen Residing
in Florida to Sue in Bogotd for Her Husband's Elevator-Accident Death in
Iragorri v. United Technologies
1. The MAC Defendant's FNC Strategy:
Another example of a defendant whose jurisdictional ties should have
created an irrebuttable presumption against application of FNC is Iragorri
v. United Technologies Corp.4 Haidee Iragorri, a native of Columbia resi-
dent in Florida, filed suit against United Technologies (and its Otis Elevator
subsidiary) in U.S. District Court in Connecticut on a products liability the-
ory. Iragorri's deceased husband, a Florida domiciliary and U.S.-
naturalized citizen, died after falling in an Otis elevator in Columbia.
Rather than sue in the far-off venue of her husband's death (Columbia), she
sought redress from the manufacturer and its parent-again in their own
backyards where each maintained its worldwide corporate headquarters.
The federal district judge, however, dismissed the suit on FNC grounds that
widow Iragorri should have sued these American companies in Columbia.48
The district court's approach provoked an en banc court of appeals to re-
examine what was being done by the district benches in FNC lawsuits.
Judicial soul-searching produced observations such as "[t]he rule is not
so abrupt or arbitrary" as to see forum shopping in every case where the
plaintiff does not sue at home "because one of the factors that necessarily
affects a plaintiffs choice of forum is the need to sue in a place where the
defendant is amenable to suit. '49 This was followed by the common-sense
conclusion that "[w]here a U.S. resident leaves her home district to sue the
defendant where the defendant has established itself and is thus amenable to
suit ... would not ordinarily indicate a choice motivated by desire to im-
pose tactical disadvantage on the defendant., 50 Recognizing the linkage be-
tween appropriate forums for personal jurisdiction purposes and FNC
purposes, the Second Circuit emphasized "[a] plaintiff should not be com-
pelled to mount suit ... where she cannot be sure of perfecting jurisdiction
over the defendant."5'
47 Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp, 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).481 Id. at 65.491 Id. at 72.




Critical of the enthusiasm with which courts in the circuit had em-
braced FNC as a docket-screening device, the en banc court noted that "[I]n
our recent cases, we vacated dismissals for [FNC] because we believed that
the district courts had misapplied the basic rules. '52 Struggling with the
unguided discretion created by Gilbert and Reyno, the court engaged in
some judicial finger-wagging at its district judges:
Courts should be mindful that, just as plaintiffs sometimes choose a forum for
forum-shopping reasons, defendants may also move for dismissal under [FNC]
not because of genuine concern with convenience but because of similar fo-
rum-shopping reasons. District courts should therefore arm themselves with
an appropriate degree of skepticism in assessing whether the defendant has
demonstrated genuine inconvenience and a clear preferability of the foreign fo-
rum.
53
Although the Second Circuit had good motivations, such admonitions
do not appear reasonably calculated to stem abuses of discretion.5 4 Indeed,
the District Judge in Iragorri apparently scoured the record in an effort to
oust the plaintiffs choice of forum, even attaching negative significance to
the fact that "the [Iragorri] children and their mother had spent a few school
52 Id. at 72.
531 d. at 75.
54 The Iragorri court took on a losing battle in trying to reform the FNC rule without
reconceptualizing it, because the very nature ofjudicial discretion prevents its management.
Judges view their discretion to order FNC dismissals expansively, much in the terms that
Second Circuit Judge Timbers articulated in 1978:
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is not a neat divider, like a fence, which separates the cases
where jurisdiction should be retained from those where it should not. Instead, it meanders, like a
river; and as a river with time may change its course by the erosion and build-up of its banks, so too
the judge-made doctrine of forum non conveniens develops new twists and bends, shrinking and
growing as it confronts novel factual situations.
Alcoa Steamship Co. v. M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F.2d 165, 173 (1978) (J. Timbers, dissent-
ing in part), rev'd en banc, 564 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1980). While Judge Timbers apparently
thought this was a persuasive justification for allowing district judges expansive discretion to
order FNC dismissals, it is in fact an accurate assessment of the causes of dissonance in
court-access doctrine produced by application of a discretionary FNC rule.
55 Iragorri, supra note 14, at 75.
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terms in Columbia on a foreign exchange program. 55 The court of appeals
felt the need to underscore for the district court on remand that this "seems
to us to present little reason for discrediting the bona fides of their choice of
the Connecticut forum., 56 However, there is no need to tolerate the mis-
chief inherent in the double-barreled temptations created by discretion
without meaningful boundaries and opportunistic docket-clearing. A
clearer view of FNC-based on the principle-rule distinction and Professor
Youngblood's court access metaphor-would have settled the matter with-
out need for a remand. Again, this is a classic Quadrant I case and the pre-
sumption against FNC dismissal should be irrebuttable.57
2. Why FNC Was Inappropriate in Iragorri: Applying the New Model Stat-
ute
Iragorri, residing in the United States, sued the designer and manufac-
turer of the elevator whose defects, she alleges, caused her husband's death
in Columbia. How did she select the district court in which to file suit? By
the residence of the parent corporation. As the Second Circuit described the
key facts, there is a compelling nexus between this case and the United
States:
The named defendants were Otis Elevator Company ("Otis"), a New Jersey
corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut; United Tech-
nologies Corporation ("United")--the parent of Otis-a Delaware corporation
whose principal place of business is also in Connecticut; and International
Elevator, Inc. ("International"), a Maine corporation, which since 1988 had
done business solely in South America. It is alleged that prior to the accident,
an employee of International had negligently wedged open the elevator door
with a screwdriver to perform service on the elevator, thereby leaving the shaft
exposed and unprotected.58
The complaint alleged two theories of liability against defendants Otis
and United: that (a) International acted as an agent for Otis and United such
that the negligent acts of its employee should be imputed to them, and (b)
Otis and United were liable under Connecticut's products liability statute
for the defective design and manufacture of the elevator which was sold and
installed by their affiliate, Otis of Brazil.
On United's website, Otis bills itself as "a wholly-owned subsidiary of
United" and "the world's largest manufacturer, installer, and servicer of
elevators, escalators, moving walkways and other horizontal transportation
56 id.
57 See Youngblood, supra note 42.
58 Irragori, supra note 13, at 700.
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systems. 59 Under the link to "Our Company" Otis touts its connections to
United:
Otis is part of United Technologies Corporation, a Fortune 500 company and
world leader in the building systems and aerospace industries. Sharing
strengths with UTC allows Otis to draw on remarkable resources in engineer-
ing, product testing, purchasing, marketing and information systems. Otis
brings all these strengths to bear in creating better solutions for our custom-
ers.
60
In addition to exploiting its "vertical" corporate relationship, Otis em-
phasizes its "horizontal" relationships-its ability to be present in your
country and to speak your language. 61  The opening web page of Otis's
website contains a drop-down menu with country and language specific
sites for Otis-64 different countries and in at least a dozen different lan-
guages.62 Otis boasts to shareholders and investors of its global reach and
dominance:
With 80,000 elevators and escalators sold annually, Otis has an approxi-
mate 27 percent share of the world elevator new equipment market. Click on
the subhead above for more interesting facts about Otis.
... With 1.5 million Otis elevators and 100,000 escalators in operation,
Otis touches the lives of people in more than 200 countries around the world.
The World of Otis provides insight into the spirit of service, innovation and
quality that make Otis a trusted leader today. Click on the subhead to learn
more about the world of Otis.
63
Accepting Otis' invitation to "[c]lick on the subhead," under About
Otis-Otis Facts, the reader is treated to a description of marvelous tech-
nology that connects Otis in the U.S. to individual Otis elevators around the
world:
59 UTC Business Units, at http://www.utc.com, with a direct link to www.otis.com (last
visited on Dec. 1, 2003).
60 UTC Business Units, at http://www.utc.com, with a direct link to www.otis.com (last
visited on Dec. 1, 2003).
61 Otis, at http://www.otis.com (last visited on Dec. 1, 2003).
62 Our Company, About Otis, at http://www.otis.com/cp/categorydetails/
1,2239,CLIl_CPI1_RESi,00•html (last visited on Dec 1, 2003).
63 Our Company, About Otis-Otis Facts, The World of Otis, at http://www.otis.com/cp/
categorydetails/1,2239,CL1 I_CPI IRES 1,00.html (last visited on Dec 1, 2003.
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Remote Elevator Monitoring
The REM® system identifies many problems before they occur by de-
tecting failing components and intermittent anomalies that might have gone
undetected until they caused a service disruption. Intermittent problems can be
addressed before they cause a loss of service. If the REM system detects an
urgent issue, the system alerts the appropriate dispatching center and mechan-
ics are sent to repair it and restore service. REM service has been continu-
ously advancing in performance and capabilities since its introduction in the
mid-1980s. The latest developments allow REM data to be transmitted di-
rectly over the Internet.
Internet Service
e*Service combines REM data with technicians' reports to give custom-
ers access to information about their elevators and escalators directly over the
Internet. Internet monitoring through e*Service helps customers to better
manage their buildings by giving them access to reports showing trends in up-
time, service call types and technicians' documentation-anytime, anywhere.
Telecom Links
Centralized communications services such as the OTISLINE® center
create vital links among elevator service professionals, building managers and
the equipment itself. These telecom services can wirelessly contact emergency
technicians, immediately notifying them of a problem and its location. The
centralized communications hub features a 24-hour service network available
to customers regardless of location. With one call, a problem can be identi-
fied, a mechanic dispatched, and replacement parts located and rushed to the
site. 64
The reader is also treated to facts about the international size and scope
of Otis-heavily emphasizing that most of Otis' business, operations, and
revenues are generated by having carried its products and services to con-
sumers in other countries-il.4 million elevators installed world-wide,
53,000/60,000 employees employed "outside the United States," and $6.8
billion 2002 revenues "of which 77 percent was generated outside the
United States. '65 Otis explains that it operates by training its employees in
64 Id.(emphasis added). To navigate to these quotes, at the "About Otis" page, click on
"About Elevators" on the left menu bar, then click on the link "Continuing Innovation" from
the list under the heading "About Elevators."
65 Id. To navigate, click on "Otis Facts" from the Our Company /About Otis page
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the U.S. to work on "global issues", to have "global impact", and to prepare
to "U]oin a regional or location team working globally to maximize brand
identity and meet customer needs. 6 6 It also emphasizes that has "global
values" regarding employees, suppliers, customers, competitors, and com-
munities.
6
Obviously, Otis does not view itself as an insular, New England busi-
ness that could not reasonably anticipate being haled into a court near its
headquarters for the actions of one of these touted subsidiaries abroad. Al-
though Otis "spun off' International Elevator four years before the accident,
it was undisputed in this case that International Elevator "still distributes
and services Otis elevators, 68 to the requirements, training, and standards
of Otis-assuming, as we must, that Otis is telling the truth about its
"global reach" to shareholders and investors. Thus, as to any given product
injury inflicted abroad by an Otis elevator, the relevant operating subsidi-
ary-be it "International Elevator" or some other operating entity-at the very
least has regular contacts with its Connecticut-based parents. The causes of
action arising from those foreign injuries arise, to a substantial extent, from
the design and maintenance of the elevator product that is supervised or
controlled by headquarters employees.
Looking at the relationship among the parties, the litigation, and the fo-
rum, there can be no stronger ties to a forum than a defendants' presence in
66 Id. To navigate, click on "Working Otis" on the left menu bar, then click on "Market-
ing and Sales" from the list under "Careers" at the center of the page.
67 Id. To navigate, click on "Our Company," then on "About Otis." This will present a
menu from which you will click on "We Believe ... Otis Global Values."
68 Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). International was no
longer a party to the case at the time of the Second Circuit en banc decision. That is because
the district judge in Connecticut had spit up Iragorri's lawsuit and transferred her identical
claims against International to the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, Interna-
tional's state of incorporation. The District Judge in Maine granted International an FNC
dismissal. This appears to have been based primarily on the assertion that International was
"spun off" in 1988. However, the record did not appear to contain facts about how, after the
"spin-off," International continued to "distribute and service" a highly technological product
such as an Otis elevator designed and manufactured by Otis in the United States. Thorough
and incisive discovery on that point would probably have revealed sufficient contacts be-
tween International and the Connecticut entities that control product design, product distribu-
tion, establishment of maintenance standards, and training of personnel to satisfy the court-
access doctrines for a Connecticut forum. In that event, the connections between Interna-
tional, the litigation, and the forum establish that Section 1404.1 [3][D] would have created a
presumption that International "is not prejudiced by the maintenance of the action in the fo-
rum" where its parents are located-and in the country in which it continues to enjoy the
benefits of its long-standing Maine incorporation. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d at 11. (Inter-
national "was incorporated in Maine in 1924" and "retained its Maine charter" even after the
spin off). Given the integral relationship with Otis in Connecticut that it presumably has to
maintain as Otis' principal distributor in Central America, International would have a heavy
burden to establish that it would be prejudiced at all, let alone by clear and convincing evi-
dence that it would be prejudiced under the demanding standard of Section 1404.1 [2][A] of
the Model Statute.
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it as the seat of its business. As to defendants United and Otis, there should
be a conclusive presumption-irrebuttable-that there is no FNC issue aris-
ing from the relationship of the parties, the litigation, and the forum. This
defendant would be subject to Sections 3.B and 3.B.1 of the Model Statute.
Under those sections, the District Court had jurisdiction under Section 3.A
and under Section 3.B. 1, Untied and International's systematic and con-
tinuous contacts create the conclusive presumption "that [it] cannot estab-
lish prejudice and that plaintiff[s'] court access shall be preserved."
3. How Applying the Model Statute in Iragorri Recognizes the Intersecting
Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation Principles
United Technologies and Otis market and conduct themselves as global
providers of elevator products and related maintenance services from their
headquarters in the United States. In doing so, they have achieved world
dominance in the field, as witnessed by their own employment, product
placement, and revenue figures. This creates an especially compelling case
for remedying the non-reciprocal risks created by the activities of United
Technologies and Otis-risks which, as with all highly sophisticated tech-
nologies, are neither visible nor understood by the average user, and are
grossly nonreciprocal to those who suffer the consequences.
Corrective justice is best achieved here through judicial regulation of
the principal players in the country where the tort (of design and/or manu-
facture of the product) occurred and where the marketing and sales effort to
export that tortuous conduct is planned and coordinated-the United States.
Indeed, this case highlights the obsolescence of lex loci delicti notions in a
global market: although the injury occurred in Columbia, it was a natural-
ized American citizen who was killed and his family (resident in America)
that suffered the consequences from the failure of Otis product. When
viewed from the proper perspective, such a powerful synergy of factors is
not surprising, because this case falls clearly within the intersecting domain
of the corrective justice and enterprise regulation principles.69
C. Ignoring the Enterprise Regulation Principle: How DuPont Persuaded a
Federal Court to Ignore Hundreds of Pending Benlate Lawsuits by
American Farmers to Deny an American Forum to Costa Rican Farmers
Suing for the Same Kinds of Benlate-Caused Damages in Proyectos
Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
1. The MNC Defendant's FNC Strategy
The District Court for the Middle District of Florida turned a cold
shoulder to Costa Rican commercial farmers who brought a products liabil-
ity suit against DuPont for "damage to commercial nursery crops and real
69 See Van Detta, supra note 2, at Diagram 5 and accompanying text.
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property located in foreign countries allegedly arising from the plaintiffs'
application of an agricultural fungicide manufactured by DuPont known as
Benlate.",70 Benlate became the Pinto of agricultural products.71 Benlate
not only killed the unwanted fungi that attack farmers' crops, it also killed
the crops themselves and contaminated the land. Farmers claimed that
Benlate suffered from a manufacturing defect (contamination) or design de-
fect. Commercial farmers filed large numbers of products liability lawsuits
against DuPont, many of which the corporation settled; later, many of the
farmers who settled sued to set aside those settlements, claiming that Du-
Pont had engaged in serious fraud by not revealing compromising labora-
tory tests on Benlate.72 Several lawsuits between DuPont customers and the
corporation were filed on these grounds in federal and state courts in Flor-
ida.7
3
70 Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 896 F.
Supp. 1197, 1199 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
71 American farmers and their neighbors unleashed a torrent of litigation against DuPont
to obtain compensation for the extensive damage caused to their businesses, land, and per-
sons. It is therefore even more astonishing to see how the courthouse doors in various
American forums were slammed in the face of foreign individuals and business simply be-
cause they were international citizens injured abroad by use of the product. A simple search
in Westlaw for Benlate-related cases retrieves nearly 100 items. The following list of cita-
tions illustrates the magnitude of the domestic side of Benlate-related litigation. See, e.g.,
DuPont Ordered to Pay $78.3 Million in Benlate Damages Case, 19 No. 9 ANDREWS Toxic
CHEM. LlTIG. REp. 3 (2001); John R. Schmertz & Mike Meier, Florida Jury Finds Against
DuPont in Benlate Litigation, 7 INT'L L. UPDATE 127 (2001); Kathryn Ericson, Judge Fines
DuPont $115 Million for Fraud Against Court in Benlate Litigation, with Reprieve Offered
for Public Repentance, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, August 24, 1995, 1995 WL 909051; DuPont
Must Pay $101 Million Fine or Publicly Acknowledge its Fraud on the Court for Concealing
Benlate Evidence, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, August 24, 1995, 1995 WL 909054; Shareholder
Asks DuPont Leadership to Pay Benlate Trial Fine, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, August 24, 1995,
1995 WL 909069.
72 See, e.g., Fuku-Bonsai, Inc. v. E.I Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 187 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.
1999).
73 See e.g., Foliage Forest, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 221 F.3d 1199 (11 th
Cir. 2000), in reliance on certified question answered in Florida Evergreen Foliage E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Florida Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d 457 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999);
Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 223 F.3d 1275 (1 1th Cir. 2000), in
reliance on certified question answered by Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours
& Co., 761 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 2000). For example, in ruling on a question certified by the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the Delaware Supreme Court answered
that Florida Evergreen could sue DuPont again on its allegation that prior to the settlement,
DuPont withheld scientific data that would have put Florida Evergreen in a better position to
win on the merits and therefore reach a better settlement, the settlement agreement did not
bar the fraud claim, and that damages could be calculated accounting for the amount paid in
the first settlement. Florida Evergreen Foliage, 744 A.2d at 465; see Harper v. E.I. Du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 802 So. 2d 505 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001) (following the rulings in Mazzoni
and Florida Evergreen to lift stay and permit growers to proceed with Benlate-settlement-
fraud lawsuit against DuPont)
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Benlate's notoriety in the United States, as well as the fact that many
American farmers had sued DuPont all over the country for Benlate-related
product injuries, carried no weight with the district court. The court dis-
counted DuPont's obvious national presence in the Benlate business with
the observation that "there is no allegation that" DuPont representatives
marketing and selling Benlate in Florida "were involved in any way with
the sales at issue here or otherwise interacted with these plaintiffs with re-
spect to their purchases of Benlate., 74 The court instead pulled out Gilbert
factors that had little to do with actual inconvenience to DuPont. It empha-
sized that the damaged property was located in a foreign country, even sug-
gesting that an FNC dismissal was appropriate because "there would be no
realistic possibility of providing for a view of the premises" by the jury, al-
though this was a case that could largely be determined by expert review of
laboratory data that could be analyzed anywhere.75 In the paternalistic fash-
ion typical of federal court FNC dismissals, the court cited the concentra-
tion of plaintiff's witnesses and records "in the foreign forums," while
discounting the fact that the defense witnesses-whose convenience FNC is
supposedly concerned with-were "largely located in Delaware," where the
plaintiffs offered to go to depose them and to produce the plaintiffs em-
ployee witnesses for deposition. 76 Supposedly mindful of the plaintiffs' in-
convenience, the court also cited the burden on the federal court and the
community of potential jurors of trying the case in the plaintiff's chosen fo-
rum-a forum in which DuPont's contacts are pervasive enough to support
general jurisdiction.77
2. Why FNC was Inappropriate in Orchimex: Applying the Model Statute
Like Honeywell in the Lueck case, DuPont was sued in its backyard-
albeit, a rather large tract of backyard because it "does business" just about
everywhere imaginable in the United States, and was unquestionably sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in plaintiffs choice of forum.78 In this case,
74 Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, 896 F. Supp. at 1200.
7 5 1d. at 1202.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1203-04.
78 See John D. MacKinnon, Florida Journal: Growers File New Suits on Benlate, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 3, 1999, at F1 (describing the protracted litigation over a fungicide manufactured
by Dupont that was alleged to have been "contaminated with a class of ultratoxic herbicides"
that caused widespread crop damage); Milo Geyelin, Judge Weighs Sanctions in DuPont
Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1995, at B8 (reporting that DuPont faces sanctions for its strat-
egy of withholding evidence and resisting discovery in the Hawaii Benlate litigation); James
P. Miller & Milo Geyelin, DuPont's Defense in Benlate Litigation may be Weakened by Case
in Hawaii, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30 1995, at B8 (recounting plaintiffs' attorneys' belief that Du-
Pont faces more litigation and higher damage awards as a result of its behavior in the Hawaii
Benlate litigation); Eric L. Home & William B. Pentecost, Jr., Recent Developments in Toxic
Tort Law, 37 TORT & INS. L. J. 749, 775 (2002). See In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.-
Justice Restored
24:53 (2003)
there was no question that all of the court access rules were met. DuPont
marketed and sold Benlate within Florida. 9 Indeed, although incorporated
and headquartered in Delaware, DuPont's business activities are so perva-
sive in the United States that it is hard to imagine a state in which it does
not "do business," let alone have minimum contacts. 80  The Mazzoni and
Florida Evergreen litigations are indicative of the pervasiveness of Benlate
in Florida. Benlate lawsuits against DuPont, therefore, fall within that class
of cases in which courts in Florida may exercise general personal and legis-
lative jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant corporation because of the
pervasiveness of its contacts-a Quadrant III case in Professor Youngblood's
court access metaphor "in which the continuous corporate operations within
a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealing entirely distinct from
those activities. 8 1
Moreover, as with United Technologies, DuPont is hardly a provincial
company that can claim that it does not expect that its global activities will
cause product-related injuries for which it can be held accountable in the
United States. To the contrary, DuPont describes itself as a global "sci-
ence" company to its shareholders and investors and it touts its global
reach. DuPont explains that its $4.3 billion of annual net income is gener-
ated by a 79,000-employee workforce, half of which "work outside the
United States" in one of over 70 countries in which DuPont's 135 manufac-
turing and processing facilities and 35 research-development-customer ser-
vice labs are located. 2 These numerical facts are graphically reinforced by
DuPont's lengthy list of operating subsidiaries located in numerous U.S.
states and foreign states, 83 along with numerous joint ventures throughout
Benlate Litigation, 99 F.3d 363 (1 Ith Cir. 1996), cert. denied, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and
Co. v. Bush Ranch, Inc., 522 U.S. 906 (1997).
79 Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, 896 F. Supp. at 1199.
80 DuPont has been registered with the Florida Secretary of State's Office to do business
in the state since 1915. Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, available at
http://ccfcorp.dos.state.fl.us/ (last visited June 1, 2002). See, e.g., Dahlgren's Nursery v. E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 91-8709-CIV, 1994 WL 1251231 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Pritchett
v. E.l. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., No. 93-536-CIV-T-17(A), 1994 WL 150834 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Murray v. Remington Arms Co., 795 F. Supp. 805, 807 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (noting
that DuPont effectively conceded the court's general jurisdiction over it, because it "main-
tains a registered agent for service of process in Mississippi, although it maintains corpora-
tion headquarters in Delaware"); Eskofot A/S v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 872 F.
Supp. 81, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Du Pont is one of the largest companies in the world, with
hundreds of subsidiaries and annual sales of approximately $40 billion.").
81 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
82 DuPont Overview: Company at a Glance, at http://www.dupont.com/corp/overview/
glance/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).
83 DuPont Overview: Subsidiaries, at http://www.dupont.comlcorp/overview/
subsidiaries/subsidiaries city.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).
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the world.84 Yet despite this far-flung economic empire, all roads lead to-
Delaware. Delaware, DuPont's state of incorporation and site of its corpo-
rate headquarters, is where new products are developed-including Benlate,
once DuPont's leading product. On its company website, DuPont boasts to
its shareholders and investors of the unifying effect of its most important
research and development work:
A key component of du Pont Science and Technology is the effort of
Central Research and Development (CR&D), which employs over 1500 people
at the Experimental Station and Chestnut Run facilities in Wilmington, Del.
CR&D is the foundation of our science efforts and has been responsible
for most of our major product breakthroughs. CR&D provides both leveraged
scientific services to the corporation and long term research activities.
85
DuPont has dubbed its centralized approach to research and develop-
ment for its global operations the "Growth Council research process." The
corporation's own description of the Growth Council research process
documents the integration of DuPont's activities that is conspicuously ab-
sent from the district court's decision in Orchimex:
The Growth Council process starts with proposals submitted for research
projects and must contain a technical and business case for the research to be
pursued for DuPont. Each of the proposals is evaluated by a group of senior
business leaders within DuPont (Growth Council) who determine if the pro-
posal meets the criteria to resource the proposal. Through this process we
manage our long term research as a portfolio of projects.
Transitioning to this project structure, CR&D developed processes to
evaluate, activate, staff, track, develop and, if necessary, terminate projects.
Growth Council ensures a continued match between the business case and the
technical accomplishments of projects. 86
In light of DuPont's highly integrated and centralized business con-
trolled from its Delaware corporate lair, it is difficult to imagine how a fed-
eral court could dismiss international plaintiffs' lawsuits anywhere in the
U.S. on the purely technical rationale that the harmful product was not sold
to the plaintiffs in that particular forum.
Looking at the relationship among the parties, the litigation, and the fo-
rum, a pervasively-present MNC such as DuPont has little or no argument
84 DuPont Overview: Businesses & Joint Ventures, at http://www.dupont.com/corp/
overview/ventures/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).8 5 DuPont Science: Central Research & Development, at http://www.dupont.com/
corp/science/rd/index.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).86 1d.
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that it will suffer the prejudice of which the Model Statute Section
1404.1[2][A] speaks, at least when sued in a U.S. forum. Thus, Sections
3.A and 3.B. 1 of the Model Statute would recognize that FNC had no appli-
cation in this case in view of the relationship of the parties, the litigation,
and the forum. Had the Model Statue applied in this case, the district court
would have been bound to retain its jurisdiction of this lawsuit under Sec-
tion 3.A and under Section 3.B.1, because DuPont's systematic and con-
tinuous contacts throughout the United States create the conclusive
presumption "that [it] cannot establish prejudice and that plaintiffis'] court
access shall be preserved."
3. How Applying the Model Statute in Orchimex Recognizes the Intersect-
ing Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation Principles
If ever there was a case of non-reciprocal risk to which a U.S.-based
MNC subjected international plaintiffs, Benlate is surely that case. With far
less access to "scientific farming" information than their American-based
counterparts, 87 international growers were more susceptible to the risks cre-
87 Agriculture has become a university-based college major, with programs like the one in
the College of Agriculture and Life Sciences at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York,
training students to become 21 st century scientific farmers well-grounded in science and
technology as applied to agriculture. See Cornell College of Agriculture and Life Sciences:
Majors for Undergraduates-Crop and Soil Sciences, at http://www.cals.cornell.edu/oap/
admissions/majors/major_08.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002) (Cornell's description of its
B.S. degree program in agriculture). Cornell, for example, clearly sees its program in these
terms:
Simply put, we are considered the very best at what we do in the nation, if not the world. We are
unique in that we are the only college of agriculture and life sciences that is a member of both the
Ivy League and the equally prestigious land grant university system. We enjoy the benefits of being
a college that is both publicly funded and privately endowed. All of which bring with them advan-
tages when it comes to research opportunities, access to world-renowned faculty, internships and
post graduation opportunities, and learning alongside some of the brightest students in the nation. All
this from a college and university that "grew up on a farm," or so the saying goes.
Cornell College of Agriculture and Life Sciences: An Overview of CALS, at
http://www.cals.comell.edu/oap/admissions/overview.cfm (last visited Oct. 18, 2002). Cor-
nell agriculture students may concentrate in the sophisticated study of soil science, which is
described as:
courses in calculus, chemistry, physics, and geology. In addition, undergraduates should take the in-
termediate Soil Science courses, which provide depth in soil genesis, soil classification, soil physics,
soil chemistry, and soil microbiology. Students also typically take other courses such as remote sens-
ing, soil water management, and tropical soils, which are taught in the department. This concentra-
tion of courses is important for the study of environmental problems.
Id. In addition, Cornell agriculture students may specialize in plant protection, which:
combines the traditional disciplines of entomology, plant pathology, and weed science into a single,
integrated program of study for students who are interested in leaming how to manage factors that
limit crop production. In addition to practical training in plant protection, each student is expected to
develop a working knowledge of ecology and farm business management and expertise in the pro-
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ated by Benlate, because of the nature of their economies and the degree of
harm Benlate appears to be capable of causing. Similarly, the activities of
an American-based MNC have rarely called for more judicial regulation
than in the DuPont example. Not only did DuPont release into wide inter-
national distribution a clearly-defective product, it then concealed the extent
of its knowledge of the defect and nearly succeeded in extracting fraudulent
waivers and releases from crop growers who were ignorant of DuPont's be-
havior at the time. Such systemic misconduct at high levels of a business
incorporated and headquartered in the United States falls within the meati-
est part of the intersecting domains between the corrective justice and en-
terprise regulation principles.
D. Gutting the Enterprise Regulation Principle: How DuPont Persuaded a
Delaware Trial Court to Immunize It from International Products Liability
Lawsuits in the Courthouse Down the Street from its International
Headquarters to Deny an American Forum to Costa Rican Farmers Suing
for the Same Kinds of Benlate-Caused Damages in Ison v. E.L DuPont de
Nemours & Co.
1. The MNC Defendant's FNC Strategy
Apparently emboldened by the federal court system's seeming hostility
to the foreign products-liability plaintiffs, DuPont persuaded the Delaware
Superior Court to dismiss on the basis of FNC a suit filed there by British
Commonwealth citizens whose children allegedly suffered Benlate-related
birth defects in Ison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.88 The Ison decision
provides a striking picture of just how far FNC doctrine has drifted from the
moorings of court access doctrine and the principles of corrective justice
and enterprise regulation.
Without any indication that it recognized the implications of dismiss-
ing a lawsuit against a corporation filed literally within blocks of the corpo-
ration's international headquarters in the corporation's state of
incorporation, the superior court tersely observed that "[t]he only connec-
tion that this case has to Delaware is that the defendant has its principal
duction of a particular crop or group of crops.
Cornell College of Agriculture and Life Sciences: Plant Science Specialization, at
http://www.cals.comell.edu/oap/admissions/majors/plantprot.cfm (last visited Oct. 18,
2002).
88 See Ison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., C.A. No. 97C-06-094-VAB, 1998 Del. Su-
per. LEXIS 426, quoted in Ison v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 729 A.2d 832, 837 n.7
(Del. 1999). The plaintiffs claimed agriculturally-related exposure to Benlate in New Zea-
land, England, Wales, and Scotland caused anopthalma or micropthalmia-severe birth de-
fects in which the child is born without eyes or with microscopic eyes-in their children.
Ison, 729 A.2d at 836, n.1.
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place of business here and is incorporated here." 89 The plaintiffs appealed
to the Delaware Supreme Court, which reversed the dismissal.
The Delaware courts employed a set of six factors in FNC cases that
resemble the Gilbert public and private interest factors. 90 However, the
Delaware Supreme Court struggled to reign in the unbridled discretion that
resulted from the absence of any rules or presumptions to restrain the trial
courts in the use of these factors. It emphasized a presumption that FNC
does not apply "except in the rare case where the defendant establishes ...
overwhelming hardship and inconvenience," and that "it is not enough that
all of the ... factors may favor" a defendant's FNC argument.9 1 The "over-
whelming hardship and convenience" language tracks the second part of the
International Shoe test, and it can be determinative in Quadrant II cases in
Professor Youngblood's court access metaphor.
92
This, however, was clearly a classic Quadrant III case, as the defendant
is doing business in the forum and is therefore subject to general jurisdic-
tion there for all lawsuits against it. 9 3 The court concluded that this was not
"one of those rare cases where the drastic relief of dismissal is warranted
based on a strong showing that the burden of litigating in this forum is so
severe as to result in manifest hardship to the defendant., 94 Here, the court
observed, "the key factors are that the defendant's principal place of busi-
ness is in this forum and there are significant contacts here with the al-
leged[ly] defective product." 95 The court plodded through the amorphous
multi-factor analysis. However, it did not consider how the court access
rules (e.g., the personal jurisdiction rules) would treat those facts, nor did
the court acknowledge the connection between the facts relevant to the
court access rules and the facts relevant to FNC analysis. Although the
89 Id. at 837.
90 The factors are (1) the relative ease of access to proof; (2) the availability of compul-
sory process for witnesses; (3) the possibility of the view of the premises; (4) whether the
controversy is dependent upon the application of Delaware law which the courts of this State
more properly should decide than those of another jurisdiction; (5) the pendency or non-
pendency of a similar action or actions in another jurisdiction; and (6) all other practical
problems that would make the trial of the case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Id. at 838
(quoting General Foods Corp. v. Cyro-Maid, Inc., 198 A.2d 681, 684 (Del. 1964)).
91 Id. at 838 (quoting Chrysler First Bus. Credit Corp. v. 1500 Locust Ltd. Partnership,
669 A.2d 104, 105 (Del. 1995)).
92 Cases in which there are single or occasional contacts out of which the cause of action
arises (Quadrant II). Youngblood, supra note 43, at 7. In those cases, "the propriety of the
jurisdictional exercise will depend upon the quality of the defendant's forum acts," which
will have a direct correlation to the "convenience" or "fairness" factors alluded to in Interna-
tional Shoe ("traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice") and delineated in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). See Youngblood,
supra note 43, at 7-14.
93 See Youngblood supra note 43, at 5, & n.27, 7-8, 35-36, 45-46, & n. 315.
94 Ison, 729 A.2d at 842-43.
9 Id. at 843.
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court found that many of the factors might be viewed as "weigh[ing] in fa-
vor of DuPont," those factors "do not prove that DuPont would suffer
overwhelming burden or inconvenience if forced to litigate in Delaware."
96
To the contrary, the court concluded by observing that "DuPont's principal
place of business is in Delaware and ... that the product at issue was re-
searched and developed in Delaware effectively precludes a finding" that an
FNC dismissal was appropriate.97 What the Court did not do is to seize the
opportunity to reconceptualize the FNC rule to prevent similar dismissals in
the future.
2. Why FNC was Inappropriate in Ison: Applying the Model Statute
The Model Statute would have transformed the Ison case from a heav-
ily litigated procedural quagmire into a literal "no-brainer." This is the case
for the irrebuttable presumption of court access provided in Section
1404.1[3][B][1]. As a matter of law, an MNC in DuPont's position could
not establish prejudice when sued in the venue of its corporate headquarters,
let alone the state of its incorporation. Moreover, as prejudice is clearly de-
fined in Section 1404.1[2][A], that irrebuttable presumption is not only ap-
propriate, but also mandated. Significantly, the Model Statute eliminates
the operative rationale of the Delaware Superior Court's original dismissal.
That dismissal makes no sense unless it was based entirely on the interna-
tional citizenship of the plaintiffs; the dismissal took what Reyno had made
a factor-albeit a poisonous one for international plaintiffs-and effectively
turned it, sub silentio, into an irrebuttable presumption of the court's own
fashioning that foreign plaintiffs are never entitled to sue in American
courts for U.S.-based MNC activities where the site of the injury is a for-
eign state. Model Statute Section 1404.1[3][A] entirely eliminates this type
of blanket exclusion of foreign plaintiffs by directing preservation of court
access "without regard to nationality, citizenship, or residence" of the plain-
tiff.
3. How Applying the Model Statute in Ison Recognizes the Intersecting
Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation Principles
The enterprise regulation principle is strongest when a corporation is
sued either in its state of incorporation or in the state hosting the corpora-
tion's principal place of business, such as in Orchimex de Costa Rica, dis-
cussed in the comments under Section IV.C.3, supra. In this case, the two
9 6 d. at 847
97 Id. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the Chancery court again dismissed the lawsuit, this
time on a statute-of-limitations argument under Delaware's two-year period for bringing per-
sonal injury suits. The court interpreted the period as accruing in their case at the time the
illnesses appeared, not at the (reasonable and later) time that Benlate exposure was discov-
ered as a likely cause. Ison v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., Nos. Civ.A. 97C-06-
193CHT, 97C-06-194CHT and 97C-07-113CHT, 2002 WL 962205 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002).
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variables coincide to create the strongest rationale for advancing the enter-
prise regulation principle. Concomitantly, the corrective justice principle is
strong because the courts of the corporation's forum state are the best place
for an injured party to obtain full relief. Wilmington, Delaware is the epi-
center for the planning and concealment of the international tragedy caused
by Benlate. If corrective justice cannot be obtained there, in the forum in
which DuPont was incorporated and continues to reside (creating the great-
est interest in advancing the enterprise regulation principle), then corrective
justice simply cannot be achieved anywhere.
E. Abandoning Enterprise Regulation and Corrective Justice: the Second
Circuit Permits Texaco to Avoid Suit in the Forum of its Corporate
Headquarters by Those Whose Homes were Despoiled by Petroleum
Exploration in Aguinda v. Texaco
1. The MNC Defendant's FNC Strategy
Not all international product injury cases arise from products marketed
and exported abroad, such as Benlate. Many product injuries are inflicted
in the process of obtaining natural resources, harnessing and transporting
those resources, and processing those resources for a product. Such injuries
often result from U.S. companies' activities abroad related to the production
of a product for domestic or international consumption. Petroleum products
fuel an international effort by U.S.-based MNCs to locate and tap natural
resources critical to their ability to maintain a constantly-increasing supply
of petroleum products at competitive prices in the face of generally-rising
consumption. Such efforts involving Texaco gave rise to the Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc. case, in which citizens of Ecuador sued Texaco in the backyard
of its corporate headquarters-Foley Square, the home of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The gist of the law-
suit was described by an early commentator as, in effect, an action to rem-
edy the desolation of the plaintiffs' entire habitat by petroleum exploration
and exploitation directed by Texaco:
Texaco obtained a concession agreement from Ecuador to drill oil in
1964. Texaco, as minority partner in Petroecuador, drilled oil from 1972 to
1992. The Aguinda Complaint alleges that during that time Texaco improperly
handled wastes, several oil spills occurred, and pipelines burst, all of which re-
sulted in extensive environmental damage.
The ground water in the area is now polluted with toxins that are known
cancer causing agents. The native peoples' children are covered in growths
and the local water is not fit for bathing or consumption. Collected rainwater
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is their only water supply-and the rainwater itself was tested and found to con-
tain toxins.9 8
Foreshadowing DuPont's litigation strategy in Ison, Texaco quickly
filed a motion to dismiss under the FNC rule.99 Although the District Judge
denied that motion without prejudice to permit limited discovery of Tex-
aco's role in the Ecuadorian despoliation, the District Judge who later took
over the case twice granted forum non conveniens motions - the second
time, after a critical remand decision of the U.S. Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. 00 In his first forum non conveniens ruling, District Judge Jed Ra-
koff took the already overly-broad judicial discretion afforded to FNC dis-
missals and stretched it to effectively delegate the decision before him to
another decision-maker. He "simply relied" on another district court's rul-
ing in a different lawsuit also challenging Equadorian despoliation and did
not "independently [w]eigh the factors relevant to a forum non conveniens
dismissal" under the Gilbert/Reyno rule.' 01 Judge Rakoff's rationale con-
sisted of the statement that "the Court finds itself obliged to dismiss this ac-
tion on the same grounds of international comity and forum non conveniens
so well stated in Sequihua, to which this court can add little."' 0 2 However,
98 Jennifer K. Rankin, Note, U.S. Laws in the Rainforest: Can a U.S. Court Find Liability
for Extraterritorial Pollution Caused by a U.S. Corporation? An Analysis of Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 18 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 223-24 (1995) (footnotes omitted). As an-
other commentator described the impact of oil exploration and exploitation:
The boom of the petroleum industry was also not without environmental and human costs, which
have led to the instant lawsuit. Estimates place pipeline spills at 16.8 million gallons of crude oil
emptying into the Amazon River Basin. Additionally, almost 30 billion gallons of toxic by-products
of the petroleum extraction were released into the environment.
Lambert, supra note 1, at 113 (footnotes omitted) (noting that "an unpublished study's pre-
liminary findings state the overall rate of cancer in the Oriente [where oil exploration and
exploitation occurred] is 2.3 times higher than residents of Ecuador's capital, Quito").
99 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006, at *1-2 (S.D. N.Y. 1994).
100 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated and remanded
sub nom; Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1998), forum non conveniens motion
again granted on remand, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Worthy of noting without
expressing any particular inference, a commentator has pointed out that "Judge Rakoff is a
former partner in a large firm that represented Texaco's patent interests (although he never
personally handled any of the cases), and that he has also authored a journal article defend-
ing the officers of corporations committing environmental harms." Lambert, supra note 1, at
117 n. 51. The judge did not believe that his former firm's representation of Texaco nor his
scholarship on environmental harms raised sufficient questions about his impartiality, and he
denied the plaintiffs' motion to disqualify him. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d
438 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), mandamus pet. denied sub nom, In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194 (2d Cir.
2001).
10' Jota, 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998) (referring to Judge Rakoff's incredibly short
opinion relying on Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).




Judge Rakoff could have added quite a bit, had he been required by the law
to thoughtful, instead of making casual observations such as:
While it is true that, in contrast to the situation in Sequihua, defendant
Texaco is headquartered in this judicial district and the Complaint alleges that
decisions made by its executives in New York were important to the allegedly
unlawful activities undertaken by the consortium in Ecuador, these differences,
are, in the Court's view, insufficient to overcome the balance of other factors
that weigh so heavily against retaining jurisdiction, as outlined in Sequihua.10 3
Of course, the fact that Judge Rakoff dismissed is the key jurisdictional
fact in the case. Upon the Second Circuit's remand, he was forced to con-
front this key fact that he had glossed over in his first ruling. He did so in
an ingenuous way.
A crucial issue for trial in this case was Texaco's responsibility for the
actions of various subsidiaries, including a Delaware corporation, "which
initially operated the petroleum concession for" a consortium of private en-
tities and the Ecuadorian government "and held varying interests in the
Consortium until 1992."' Using the rhetorical skill acquired as a silk-
stocking practitioner, the Judge simply characterized this as an "indirect"
investment and insisted (apparently, as a matter of law) that Texaco lacked
"meaningful involvement" in the despoiling activities., 0 Judge Rakoff held
the plaintiffs to a remarkable standard (in light of Texaco's considerable
stake in the venture): first, that Texaco must hold a significant stake in the
venture, and second, that plaintiffs must prove the existence of "a meaning-
ful nexus between the United States and the decisions and practices here
complained of. . ." in opposing a preliminary motion.10 6 This standard is
remarkable for two reasons. First, neither Gilbert nor Reyno make issues of
parent-subsidiary relationships or ultimate degrees of corporate responsibil-
ity decisive in ruling on an FNC motion. Indeed, such questions are not
even among the public or private interest factors. Second, the Texaco-
subsidiaries' relationship presents a substantial issue of enterprise liability-
an issue that is tied up with the merits of the case. After accepting affida-
vits from corporate officials making vague assertions to distance Texaco
from the events in the Ecuadorian rain forest, Judge Rakoff used an FNC
motion to conduct, effectively, a trial on the papers of a key merits issue in
the case that should have been for the jury to determine as fact-finder. 107
In conducting this merits-on-the-papers inquiry, Judge Rakoff played
down facts that should have been interpreted to raise genuine issues of ma-
103 Id. (emphasis supplied).
104 Jota, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
" Id. at 548.
106 id.
107 Id. at 537-38, 548-550.
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terial fact for trial. For example, Texaco oversaw the budget of its Dela-
ware subsidiary, TexPet, which held a 37.5% stake in the Consortium. 08 In
addition, TexPet was under the direct supervision of Texaco's Latin Amer-
ica/West Africa division, which also wielded veto power over a variety of
TexPet contracts.'0 9 The Consortium itself did not limit its dealings with
Texaco to the TexPet subsidiary, but rather directly obtained "technical and
other assistance" from other Texaco subsidiaries in the U.S., which im-
pacted the design of its operations in Ecuador." 0 These dealings were not
inconsiderable. For example, even as the Judge described it, the Consor-
tium "received technical assistance from the U.S.-based Texas Pipeline
Company, also a subsidiary of Texaco, for certain pipeline problems.""'
"Some technical advice," Judge Rakoff s opinion conceded, "was even pro-
cured from Texaco's U.S.-based Environmental Health and Safety Divi-
sion."''12
Substituting his discretion for a jury's fact-finding, Judge Rakoff dis-
missed such facts with a wave of the judicial hand. For him, these facts
"simply establish the obvious fact that Texaco, as a corporate parent, exer-
cised some general oversight" but that its advice was irrelevant because it
was simply "to help implement design and other decisions previously
reached in Ecuador." , 3 A jury, however, should neither be entitled to hear
detailed evidence nor make the about these contacts because they might not
draw the same inferences nor make the same factual findings as Judge Ra-
koff. For example, the jury might question why, if Texaco did not fear that
its involvement provided a reasonable basis for suit in the U.S., the Consor-
tium was consulting with Texaco's U.S.-based "Environmental Health and
Safety Division" over operations taking place thousands of miles away in
Ecuador. More significantly, the evidence, even as downplayed by Judge
Rakoff, might reasonably be interpreted in the view of a jury as a calculated
effort by Texaco to use degrees of corporate separation to distance itself
from liability for activities abroad undertaken for the ultimate, direct benefit
of Texaco and its shareholders. This interpretation of the evidence fits
nicely under the rule of enterprise liability, in which a modern de-
centralized M NC format is actually refocused for a "unity of purpose" to ef-
fect "maximization of return for the group"-and its shareholders-"as a
whole."1 4 This is a multi-factored, "soft" fact-intensive legal rule, which is
108 Id. at 548-49; Rankin, supra note 98, at 223-24 n.1 1.





114 David Aronofsky, Piercing the Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends, Developments,
and the Need for Widespread Adoption of Enterprise Analysis, 10 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 36, 42 (1985); accord Rose, supra note 4, at 700 n.9; see Detlev F. Vagts, The Multina-
tional Enterprise: A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REv. 739, 791
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within a jury's province to apply as a fact-finder. 1t 5 Certainly, where the
decision of corporate operating structure is a key merits issue, it should not
be twisted into a basis for granting a FNC motion-even the Supreme Court
commanded in Reyno that courts avoid merits determinations in applying
the FNC rule-much less an opportunity to turn an FNC motion into a mo-
tion for summary judgment on the merits.
2. Why FNC is Inappropriate in Aguinda: Applying the Model Statute
As in the Ison case, the Model Statute would preclude the application
of the FNC rule here. Under Section 1404.1, the issue of corporate control
and identity would be left among other issues for trial in this case. Section
1404.1[3][B][1] provides the irrebuttable presumption that is appropriate
when the plaintiff is willing to bear the burden and expense of going to the
corporate defendant's "home turf' to sue. As Section 1404.1[2][A] defines
prejudice, Texaco could not possibly establish prejudice in this case. Tex-
aco's arguments that the government co-defendant Ecuador could not be
compulsorily joined or impleaded does not establish prejudice. To the ex-
tent that Texaco needs Ecuadorian officials or citizens as witnesses, nothing
prevents Texaco from preserving their testimony by videotape deposition in
Ecuador to be used in the trial in New York-or even from using real-time
interactive video linkage to conduct the examination via the Internet.
Should a witness in Ecuador be reluctant to appear for such a videotaped
deposition or remote-broadcast live testimony, Texaco can presumably use
the Hague Treaty to obtain local court process to compel attendance. And
should a jury hold Texaco accountable for the destruction of the plaintiffs'
habitat, Texaco may hasten to the courts of Ecuador (whose qualities Tex-
aco argued to Judge Rakoff) to seek indemnity or contribution in an action
against the government-if Ecuador is a good enough forum for injured
Ecuadorians than it should also be good enough as the forum in which Tex-
aco seeks restitution from their Ecuadorian partners in the Consortium.
3. How Applying the Model Statute in Aguinda Recognizes the Intersecting
Domains of the Corrective Justice and Enterprise Regulation Principles
Operating through subsidiaries, partnerships, and joint ventures, U.S.-
based MNCs have created a mode of operation to decentralize centralized
decision-making.'1 6 A commentator recently described this style of corpo-
rate organization:
(1970) ("If the MNE in fact poses a threat to human freedom it is because of its peculiar ef-
fectiveness. Its capacity to pursue a centralized and coordinated strategy removes decision-
making power far from the reach of people intimately affected by it.").
115 See, e.g., Glenn D. West & Brandy L. Readway, Corporations, 55 SMU L. REv. 803
(2002); Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52
LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 195-98 (1989).
116 Michael Anderson, Transnational Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort
Law the Answer?, 41 WASHBURN L. J. 399, 401 n.6 (2002); see Peter S. Menell, LegalAdvis-
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The distinctive regulatory problem posed by MNCs is their ability to op-
erate an integrated command and control system through two disaggregated in-
stitutional structures. The first of these structures is the collection of discrete
corporate units-parent, subsidiary, sister, and cousin companies-that make
up the MNC group. The second disaggregated structure housing the MNC is
the global system of separate nation-states in which those corporations are reg-
istered and do business.i
7
This phenomenon-a "centralized decentralization"-has made the in-
ternational environmental and other torts of MNCs and their corporate rela-
tives virtually unregulable under the current rules of most legal systems:
A legal command to the subsidiary is effective against neither the parent
nor against sister companies in the same group. So too, the various subsidiar-
ies within the MNC operate in a variety of sovereign jurisdictions and are sub-
ject to differing legal regimes. In theory, there is no court anywhere in the
world that exercises jurisdiction over all the components of a MNC doing
business on three or four continents. Yet many MNCs can and do operate their
many parts with a coherence of intent and implementation that resembles a
single entity--an entity that is controlled neither by international law nor the
legal norms of any single state. This state of affairs has given rise to consider-
able anxiety among some commentators, since MNCs appear to call into ques-
tion one of the most fundamental axioms of the global legal order--that at any
given time each actor is subject to the jurisdiction of at least one effective
court.'
l 8
ing on Corporate Structure in the New Era of Environmental Liability, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 399. The variety and ingenuity of such corporate structuring makes regulating MNCs a
Herculean task, perhaps even too daunting for Professor Dworkin's jurist, Hercules.
"[P]arent-subsidiary relationship[s]" may not only be "based on equity holding," but on
other business forms as well. Anderson, at 401 n.6. "[T]he general problem is even more
complicated when one realizes that multinational businesses may be linked by other means
as well-by contractual obligations, joint ventures between distinct firms, mixtures of public
and privately held companies, and informal alliances." Id. Moreover, as Anderson ob-
serves:
MNCs possess very limited legal personality under public international law, and are generally not
subject to obligations under neither treaty law nor customary international law. As private legal per-
sons, MNCs are subject to international rules only indirectly, through the mediating structures of the
state. Yet since no state controls all parts of a MNC, there is no entity charged with supervising the
totality of its behavior.
Id. at 402 n.8. It is for that reason-the absence of any single government "charged with su-
pervising the totality of its behavior"-that MNCs must be regulated by the sovereign nation
that hosts the MNCs' nerve center. That nation is virtually always the United States.
"17 Id. at 401-02.
18 Id. at 402 (footnotes omitted).
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Thus, in the current international legal order, MNCs have effectively
evaded regulation through a strategy of jurisdictional renvoi. This jurisdic-
tion renvoi has created an "anomaly in the international system" because
"the 'home' state where the parent company is based lacks the territorial ju-
risdiction to regulate the activities of subsidiaries located abroad, while the
'host' states in which the subsidiaries are located lack jurisdiction over the
parent company where many of the crucial decisions are made."'"19 As a re-
sult, as British scholar Michael Anderson has observed, "the MNC enjoys a
degree of autonomy from national jurisdiction that is unique in the global
legal order.'
120
Yet, simply throwing up our hands at the strategic structuring of MNCs
to evade regulation is no answer. The best approach is one that preserves
the MNCs autonomy as a juridical person under municipal law yet provides
a meaningful opportunity for government regulation of the MNC's harmful
activities. That approach is jurisdiction (hence regulation) at the maximum
point of impact within the MNC's structure-either in the forum of its
nerve center (i.e. headquarters) or the forum of its creation (e.g. incorpora-
tion). Thus, the relevant principles of corrective justice and enterprise regu-
lation do not let the home of U.S.-based MNCs off so easily; it is simply the
instrumentalist nature of rules such as FNC that have permitted the "anom-
aly" described by Anderson to arise. To the contrary, those principles de-
mand that both corrective justice and enterprise regulation be accomplished
in the country that provides aid and comfort-and, ultimately, corporate life-
to a MNC parent such as Texaco, Inc. That is also usually the country with
the largest shareholder audience and it is often by engaging shareholder
(and investor analyst) attention that reform of an entity's harmful activities
is initiated and similar harmful activities are curbed. As Professor Vagts
warned over 30 years ago, 12 1 the American courts are the only sensible
place for judicial regulation of MNCs to occur. That echo of that observa-
tion has recently reverberated, reinforced by 32 years of experience that
bear out Professor Vagts' insight:
In the absence of a single global court, the next best available remedy for po-
tential litigants is to gain access to the court that is best able to hold the corpo-
rate group accountable. In most, but not all cases, this will be a court located
in a country where the parent company is incorporated. The chief attraction of
such courts is that they are likely to wield jurisdiction over the corporation
with access to the largest fraction of the group's assets. Equally important,
however, is that the parent company is where control of group activities is al-
most invariably located.
122
119 Id. (footnotes omitted).
120 Id. (footnotes omitted).
121 Detlev Vagts, supra note 114, at 791.
122 Michael Anderson, supra note 116, at 410 (footnotes omitted).
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The responsibility of the U.S. parent of an MNC, such as Texaco, may
be obscured through complex modem business structures that may have
been adopted primarily for economic reasons. However, they have the ef-
fect, when viewed as the Second Circuit viewed them, of obscuring the sub-
stantial and pervasive influence that the parent has over the activities in
which it is an investor. For example, Texaco's nearly forty-percent ongoing
stake in the Ecuadorian enterprise that allegedly destroyed the environment
of numerous Ecuadorians is significant. That magnitude of financial com-
mitment necessarily implies a power of control over the foreign activities,
regardless of whether that power was translated into action. In Aguinda,
Texaco went to great lengths to prove that it did not direct the alleged envi-
ronmental despoliation. However, neither Judge Rakoff nor the Second
Circuit considered whether Texaco's efforts might well permit a reasonable
inference that it willingly sat back, when it in fact should have acted to pre-
vent its invested venture from carrying on the very activities for which it
tried so hard to delegate responsibility.
The objectives of corrective justice and enterprise regulation do not
end with addressing corporate malfeasance; they also address nonfeasance
where the corporation has the economic influence and scientific sophistica-
tion to recognize the harm its business partners are causing, but elects to do
nothing. Yet the failure of the federal courts in Aguinda to recognize the
possible ramifications of the corporate nonfeasance strategy at the heart of
Texaco's defense is the height of instrumentalist jurisprudence. That juris-
prudence has thoroughly permeated the federal courts through the instru-
mental objectives embodied by the FNC rule. Thus, federal judges appear
to be so ready to dismiss international product injury cases that they do not
even take pause to consider the implications of rewarding Texaco for non-
feasance in the face of funding an environmental despoliation no longer
imaginable in the United States. Only by renouncing the current FNC rule
and embracing a rule of preserving court access, will the American courts
get beyond instrumental shortsightedness and assume the regulatory role
that the United States, as the epicenter of a global economy, has had thrust
upon it, whether or not its courts welcome that role.
V. CONCLUSION
The five cases discussed in this article reveal a fundamental irony in
the evolution of the FNC rule. The rule has become a mechanism to thwart
effective regulation of U.S.-based MNC activity in global markets. In ef-
fect, FNC has operated virtually to immunize MNCs against effective regu-
lation for their torts abroad on the grounds that it is "inconvenient" for U.S.-
based MNCs to defend their actions at home. MNCs continue to engage in
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tortuous conduct abroad that is not effectively redressed.1 23 Likewise, when
re-examined under the preservation-of-court-access statute that this article
suggests should replace the FNC rule in American courts, each of these five
cases would have been heard in the United States, where the state and fed-
eral governments are in the best position to regulate the conduct of corpora-
tions they have created and continue to host. By requiring American courts
to take jurisdiction of lawsuits against MNCs, the preservation-of-court-
access rule ensures the opportunity for international plaintiffs (injured
abroad by domestically-ratified or tolerated corporate activities that expose
them to non-reciprocal risks) to obtain some measure of corrective justice
for their injuries.
In the absence of statutory relief, however, the irony only continues,
and in fact, deepens. The U.S. Court of Appeals in New York has devised
an ingenious way to delegate its own work to the understaffed, under-
funded, and underdeveloped court systems in the developing world. It sim-
ply dismisses on FNC grounds with the proviso that it is "willin[g] to
reconsider if [the foreign nation's] court of last review were to uphold dis-
missal" of the case. 124 Thus, the federal court can bask in the illusion that it
has fairly "balanced" the interests of the federal courts with those of inter-
national plaintiffs, while in reality all the federal judges have done is to
subcontract the case to a forum that is more convenient for the federal court
and from which the case is unlikely to emerge. In Aguinda v. Texaco, 25 for
example, this means subcontracting the case to a forum where class actions
are unknown 126 in derogation of a Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
123 See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich & Eric Koli, Two Paths of Bayer Drug in 80's: Riskier Type
Went Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at Al, C5 (revealing that Bayer's Cuter Biologi-
cal subsidiary "sold millions of dollars of blood-clotting medicine for hemophiliacs-
medicine that carried a high risk of transmitting AIDS-to Asia and Latin America in the
mid-1980s, while selling a new, safer product in... [the United States and Europe]").
124 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 2002).
125 id.
126 In a breathtaking assertion that ignores litigation realities, the Second Circuit panel
declared that while "Ecuadorian courts do not recognize class actions," they "permit[] liti-
gants with similar causes of action arising out of the same facts to join together in a single
lawsuit." Id. at 478. The court then observed in a statement of Alice-in-Wonderland-like
quality, "[w]hile the need for thousands of individual plaintiffs to authorize the action in
their names is more burdensome than having them represented by a representative in a class
action, it is not so burdensome as to deprive the plaintiffs of an effective alternative forum."
Yet the flaws in joining 55,000 separate lawsuits together are numerous beyond merely the
need to obtain individual consent forms from each injured person. That burden is merely the
tip of the proverbial iceberg. For example, the panel did not explain how consolidating
55,000 trials under one case number addresses in any way the tremendous problems in han-
dling 55,000 trials in a system where class action and representative trial techniques, devel-
oped over years of experience in the U.S., simply do not exist. By contrast, Ecuador's
conflicting legal cultures and a veneer of French civil law have created what might modestly
be termed a legal chaos. See, e.g., John A. Zemko, Remarks by John A. Zemko at the Anti-
corruption Summit 2000, at http://www.cipe.org/programs/corruption/remarks.htm (Sept. 22,
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treaty 127 that guarantees Ecuadorians equal access to American courts, leav-
ing it to provincial courts (understaffed and without a computer system!) 28
to do the dirty work of trying some 55,000 individual claims in a country
whose court system the State Department has characterized as "politicized
and inefficient" (and MNCs constructing new pipelines there have called
"inadequate for companies to be able to work in the country") 129 and finan-
cially dependent upon a struggling central government during very hard
economic times in an economy that cannot even support a national Ecua-
dorian currency. 130  By contrast, under the preservation-of-court-access
2002) (noting that "since the Republic of Ecuador was founded 168 years ago some 92,250
legal norms have been created of which 52,774 were in force in 1997. The sheer number of
overlapping, unclear, and contradictory laws has created an environment of legal chaos and
leaves the application and enforcement of laws to the discretion of bureaucrats."); World
Bank Group, Delay in Disposition: Judicial Performance in Developing Countries, available
at http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?topic= 13&type=20&id = 114 (January 1, 1998) (not-
ing that slowest and most inefficient court systems in the world are those that are least-well
funded and use the least technology and giving Ecuador as an example, where even a single
simple debtor case takes nearly 2 2 years to decide).
127 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce, June 13, 1839, U.S.-Ecuador,
Art. 13, 8 Stat. 534 (cited in Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 547 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
128 Gail Appleson, Ecuador: Amazon Indians Appeal Texaco-Case Ruling, CoRPWATCH
(March 11, 2002), at http://www.corpwatch.org/news/PND.jsp?articleid=2009. The provin-
cial court where the Aguinda litigation will occur apparently lacks even a dedicated court-
house. Denis Arnold, Ethics and Oil in the Amazon, PRIsM (Spring 2001), at http://
www.plu.edu/-prism/ amoldarch.html.
129 Resource Center for the Americas, Pipeline Faces More Hurdles, at http://
www.americas.org/news/nir/20020927_pipeline facesmore hurdles.asp (Sept. 27, 2002).130 Foreign Commercial Service, U.S. Dept. of Trade, Ecuador Country Comnercial
Guide 2002, Ch. 3, §§ B-C, available at http://www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/
CCGurl/CCG-ECUADOR2002-CH-3:-006E06D9 (last visited May 26, 2003); International
Intellectual Property Alliance, 2002 Special 301 Report: Ecuador, 414-415 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2002/ 2002SPEC301ECUADOR.pdf (last visited May 26,
2003) (criticizing Ecuador's civil justice system); Brent Barton, Judicial Reform in Latin
America, 9-10 (2002), available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-poli/NewsandEvents/barton.pdf
(last visited May 26, 2003). Mr. Barton observes:
Ecuador's constitution guarantees citizen access to the judiciary. Theoretically, participation in Ec-
uador's judicial system is free. However, the inefficiency of Ecuador's judiciary negates this access.
The system cannot even begin to meet the demand for access. The cities of Quito and Guayaquil
have combined populations of over five million inhabitants, yet they have four public defenders to
represent them. Approximately 12,000 cases remain pending before the Supreme Court and 500,000
throughout the entire system. In 1993, the average case took 1.9 years to disposition. Ecuador's
commitment to access for everyone has resulted in access for no one. The lack of efficiency in the
judicial system has undermined its commitment to access.
Id. at 9-10. See Jim Tarbell, Showdown in Ecuador, TOWARD FREEDOM (March 2003), at
http://www.towardfreedom.com/mar03/ecuador.html (last visited May 26, 2003) (describing
volunteer coalition's effort to block construction of new oil pipeline across mountainous na-
ture preserves and rainforest lowlands and noting as of November 2002, "their case lan-
guished in the Ecuadorian judicial system, [but] OCP crews continued to plow through the
jungle"). It is also significant that in this economically-strapped country, fiscal salvation is
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statute proposed by this article, ChevronTexaco would be compelled to liti-
gate in an American forum where well-established procedural rules would
go a long way towards alleviating the grossly-disproportionate playing field
between the corporation and the international plaintiffs. If the courts of ma-
largely dependent upon the further activities of MNCs, including a dependence on Chevron-
Texaco to develop its 2.1 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. See id.; Abby Ellin, Suit says
ChevronTexaco Dumped Poisons in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at B 1. Left with no
other option by the Second Circuit, lawyers for 88 Ecuadorian lead plaintiffs have filed a
lawsuit in a provincial court in Brazil. Id. Commenting on just one of the many obstacles to
this litigation in Ecuador, an observer noted "[i]t's going to be interesting to see how a coun-
try that's so dependent on oil development is going to hold this corporation accountable."
Id.; see Jack Epstein, 'Sour Lake' Suit Finally Gets Trial in Ecuador: ChevronTexaco Ac-
cused ofAmazon Dumping, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 1, 2003, at A8.
Attorneys for thousands of the Ecuadorian plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the trial-level court
in Ecuador, and their website trumpets this as a watershed event for 2lt century international
environmental and tort law. See http://texacorainforest.com (last visited November 28,
2003) (described as a website created by Frente Para La Defensa De La Amazonia). How-
ever, the few sketchy details that the lawyers provide of the October 2003 "trial" before a
judge in a rural courthouse in Lago Agrio, Amazon Region, Ecuador show that the concerns
over the Ecuadorian legal system's ability to handle such litigation are well founded. First,
the trial procedure is something that Lewis Carroll might have appreciated. The Wall Street
Journal noted that "[q]uestioning of witnesses, including experts, in an Ecuadorian trial is
done by the judge working from questions proposed by the parties' lawyers"-hardly an ef-
fective vehicle for a full fleshing out of the facts. See http://www.texacorainforest.org/ wall-
street.htm (quoting Mark Lifsher, Chevron Would Face $5 Billion Tab For Amazon
Cleanup, Expert Says, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30. 2003). As might be expected in such a judge-
dominated trial, there is no cross-examination of witnesses, id.; no jury of the plaintiffs'
peers to evaluate the evidence and reach factual findings, id; and the trial of an incredibly
complex environmental and personal injury tort was knocked off in a mere two weeks. Id.
The judge-a political appointee of the Ecuadorian regime whose own state-oil company
was Texaco's partner in injuring the plaintiffs-is supposed to "begin conducting a personal
investigation in the field before bringing the parties back for potential further questioning"
and will issue no decision as to the viability of the plaintiffs' claims for six to eight months.
Id. It is no wonder then that ChevronTexaco feels so confident in the outcome that during
the two weeks of the trial, "it didn't present any witnesses" and has instead simply argued to
the presiding judge that plaintiffs' claims are "based on 'pseudoscience' and are 'wild and
unsubstantiated' and have moved "the Ecuadorian judge to dismiss the case because plain-
tiffs have presented 'no credible scientific evidence' that the oil company caused environ-
mental damage or violated Ecuadorian pollution laws." Id. Some might believe, to the
contrary, that this trial is a "set-up" of the MNC to be hit with a big verdict. However, in
leaving the door open for the plaintiffs to return if ChevronTexaco didn't play ball with Ec-
uadorian proceedings, we can rest assured that ChevronTexaco will vigorously-and suc-
cessfully-argue that they, too, should have access to the U.S. federal courts to review the
enforceability of proceedings that have occurred in a manner so different from those in
American courts. Thus, the federal judges in New York will simply have duplicated work
and injected the indecipherable elements of a civil-law proceeding when this case inevitably
(should plaintiffs enjoy any success in Ecuador) returns to the U.S. federal courts. For while
it was too inconvenient for ChevronTexaco to submit to trial in this case in their own back-
yard, their lawyers will undoubtedly find it more than convenient to take a short cab ride in
Manhattan to file the papers to challenge the bona fides of this legal proceeding that oc-
curred in a different legal system, in a different language, in a remote courthouse thousands
of miles away.
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jor business centers such as New York suffer, as Judge Rakoff contends,
from "the well-known congestion of American dockets [that is] is undoubt-
edly greater than that of less litigious societies like Ecuador," 131 transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 could always be made to one of the least-congested
federal courts in the country-which also happens to be a place of incorpo-
ration for many MNCs-the District of Delaware.132 But such intra-federal
system transfers cannot occur while the federal courts continue to cut off
litigation at its inception in our system. That is why Congress must act
upon a preservation-of-court-access rule to put an end to the irony of cyni-
cal "convenience" that FNC leaves as the bitter consolation to international
product injury plaintiffs.
131 Aguinda, supra note 14 at 552.
132 Joint Stock Soc'y v. Heublein, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 177, 190-91 (D. Del. 1996) (in
which Judge McKelvie notes that "[m]any plaintiffs are drawn to the District of Delaware
because of its lighter docket and faster case disposition time" and cites disposition-time and
cases-per-judge statistics among grounds for denying defendant's motion to transfer a case
filed in the District of Delaware); accord Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d
192 (D. Del. 1998); Gen. Signal Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 1995 WL 469620 (D. Del.
1995). In addition, filling existing vacancies and creating new federal judges are both (a)
effective responses that increase the availability of justice rather than rationing it and (b)
necessary even under the current regime of FNC. See William M. Richman, Essay: An Ar-
gument on the Record for More Federal Judgeships, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 37 (1999).
